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The goal of this study was to examine DSM’s posttraumatic stress disorder’s 
(PTSD) symptom structure in relation to Turkish earthquake survivors and to 
examine the strength of associations of several risk/resilience variables with PTSD. In 
addition, the aim of the study was to look at the diagnostic features and development 
of PTSD in a culture specific context, because most of the knowledge on trauma and 
emotional experiences were produced based on western cultural premises and then 
imported to other international cultures. Confirmatory factor analysis was utilized to 
test the symptom structures of PTSD and the three symptom clusters 
(avoidance/numbing, reexperiencing, and arousal) of PTSD reported in DSM-IV 
failed to be confirmed.  Exploratory factor analysis was conducted to find the best-
fitting factor structures for Turkish earthquake survivors. The data for the factor 
analyses were gathered from 440 Turkish earthquake survivors six weeks after the 
1999 Istanbul earthquake. The risk and/or resilience variables (level of exposure, 
 vi 
 
rumination, emotion regulation, and meta-mood traits) were examined in terms of 
their relationships with PTSD using data gathered from 157 Turkish survivors 
approximately two years after the earthquake. Multiple hierarchical regression 
analyses were utilized to test the strength of associations between PTSD and the 
following variables: level of exposure, age, gender, types of emotion regulation 
(suppression and reappraisal), rumination, and meta-mood traits (clarity in 
discriminating feelings, attention to feelings and mood repair). Level of exposure, 
suppression, rumination, clarity in discriminating feelings and mood repair are found 
to be related to the development of PTSD. Results are discussed in light of the 
existing literature, and limitations and directions for future studies are drawn. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
There is no place on earth that is immune from natural disasters, and millions 
of people are being killed or are suffering because of these disasters each year. 
Natural disasters differ from human made disasters because natural disasters are 
unpredictable, uncontrollable, instantaneous, concentrated, and unexpected 
(McCaughey, Hoffman, and Llewellyn, 1995). Furthermore, natural disasters affect 
the economic, social, medical, and psychological well being of not only individuals, 
but also whole communities. The psychological impacts from natural disasters are 
frequently overlooked, as attention immediately after a disaster is only focused on 
meeting essential material needs, such as food, water, sanitation, shelter, medical 
assistance, and communication (Revel, 1996).  
The most obvious symptoms manifested by the survivors of natural disasters 
are hypervigilence, hypersensitivity, recurrent and intrusive recollection of the event, 
distressing dreams, intense psychological stress at exposure to internal and/or external 
cues, and physiological reactions on exposure to cues. Fears of darkness, loud noises, 
smoke, and strangers are common. Feelings are dulled and interest in daily activities 
is diminished.  People do not believe in the future. Also, sleep disturbance, loss of 
appetite and irritability are often reported by survivors. Anger, frustration, confusion, 
a sense that life is meaningless, and survivor guilt are most disturbing to these people. 
Also, expressions of death anxiety consisting of vivid memories and images of the 
dying and massive destruction caused by the natural disaster are widely reported.  
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Within the previous research that compiles survivors’ reactions to trauma, 
substantial agreement and validation exist that PTSD is a commonly seen 
psychological problem among trauma survivors. DSM-IV clusters 17 PTSD 
symptoms into three groups: reexperiencing, avoidance/numbing, and arousal. Even 
though DSM’s PTSD formulization has been validated and widely used to generate a 
specific diagnosis, several problems have concerned trauma researchers in terms of 
the components of the three symptom clusters, which are criterion B (reexperiencing), 
criterion C (avoidance/numbing) and criterion D (arousal).   
Several factor analytic studies have examined the fitness of the symptom 
structure of PTSD to different populations with different traumatic experiences. None 
of the factor analytic studies reviewed for the present study confirms the components 
of the PTSD symptom clusters reported in DSM-IV. In other words, previous factor 
analytic studies reported different factor structures for different populations with 
different traumatic experiences. Most of the researchers suggested that avoidance and 
numbing might not be seen at the same time (e.g., McMillen, North, and Smith, 2000) 
and they should be separate clusters. It is also discussed that the construct of 
avoidance needs further clarification. For example, Anthony, Lonigan, and Hecht 
(1999) make a distinction between active avoidance (e.g., avoiding trauma related 
thoughts by engaging in distractive activities and social interactions) and passive 
avoidance (withdrawal from any activities). Some factor analytic studies found that 
avoidance may be highly correlated to arousal whereas others found that avoidance is 
correlated with reexperiencing symptom clusters. It was widely discussed that 
criterion C (avoidance/numbing) might be too stringent. The numbing response was 
found to be less common for particular types of traumatic events, such as natural 
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disasters, where survivors are more likely to receive social support (e.g., Davidson 
and Foa, 1991). 
Furthermore, a substantial amount of research has been conducted to 
understand who is more susceptible and who is more resilient to trauma.  Yet 
inconsistent findings are reported so far.  Variables such as age, gender, social 
support, type of loss, and types of coping skills and their relationships with PTSD 
have been widely studied. However, some underlying factors for survivors’ emotional 
and cognitive experiences have been overlooked. As underlying mechanisms of 
emotional and cognitive experiences, rumination, expressive/suppressive style, and 
meta-mood traits have been examined individually as key variables for depression 
and anxiety. However, the literature on these underlying mechanisms and their 
associations to PTSD is still in its infancy. These variables are of interest in the 
present study because survivors with PTSD experience two distinct types of emotion 
problems: intense negative emotional reactions, and disinterest in circumstances that 
would otherwise elicit emotion and a lack of ability to experience and express 
emotions (Litz, Orsillo, Kaloupek, & Weathers, 2000). Clarification of the 
associations between PTSD and the cognitive and emotional variables has the 
potential to explain the underlying mechanisms of these two very distinct emotional 
problems that from which trauma survivors suffer.   
Several conceptual models are presented to explain traumatic reactions. 
Among them, the cognitive theories seem the most promising in terms of explaining 
the cognitive and emotional experiences of trauma survivors. For this study, several 
cognitive and emotional processing models are integrated to explain posttraumatic 
reactions. These models suggest that traumatic experiences confront the person with 
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information that is highly discrepant from previous cognitive beliefs about the self 
and the world. Individuals attempt to integrate the threat-related information, but 
these attempts require a lot of confrontations that create severe distress and, therefore, 
a strong desire to avoid or escape. However, until this information is assimilated and 
integrated into the survivor’s existing views of the world, it will remain in the active 
memory and will continue to produce intrusive and emotionally upsetting 
recollections. Also, ironically, since this attempt at suppression creates a monitoring 
process, it might increase the automatic activation of the thoughts or emotions that are 
trying to be suppressed (Wegner, 1994). These integration and assimilation processes 
can be facilitated or hindered by some personality traits such as rumination, emotion 
regulation styles, and beliefs and attitudes about emotional experiences. However, the 
strength of the associations between PTSD and all these variables together has not 
been understood.  
This study aims to examine the symptom structures of PTSD for Turkish 
earthquake survivors and to investigate the relationships between level of exposure, 
age, gender, educational level, rumination, and emotional experiences (emotion 
regulation and meta-mood traits) and PTSD. These variables are of interest to this 
study because their impact on international survivors’ traumatic reactions to natural 
disasters has not been studied. Moreover, these variables were previously examined 
independently using different types of samples (such as all women or all men) that 
were exposed to different types of traumatic events, (such as sexual assault, war, or a 
traffic accident). In some cases, research participants were not trauma survivors at all; 
rather participants’ reactions were assessed in an artificially created stressful 
situation.  
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In the literature review section, the characteristics of natural disasters and their 
differences from human-made trauma, and the features of PTSD and its symptom 
structures are summarized. Later, cognitive and emotional processing theories are 
introduced in relation to rumination, emotion regulation (suppression and 
reappraisal), and meta-mood traits (clarity in discriminating feeling, attention to 
emotional experiences, and mood repair).   
In order to reach the research goals, two data sets were analyzed. The first 
data set, collected by Dr. Kalayjian six weeks after the August 1999 Istanbul 
earthquake, consists of 440 participants who responded to the Reaction Index Scale 
(RIS), a measure of posttraumatic symptoms, and a brief demographic questionnaire. 
These data were used to examine the symptom structures of PTSD by confirmatory 
and exploratory factor analyses.  
The second data set was gathered during January and February 2002. This 
second data set includes 157 participants who responded to the RIS, The Emotion 
Regulation Scale, The Distress From Earthquake Scale, The Meta-Mood Traits Scale, 
and a questionnaire measuring overall distress reactions (SCL-R). Several multiple 
hierarchical regression models were tested to identify the strength of associations 
between PTSD and age, gender, level of exposure, rumination, emotion regulation, 
and meta-mood traits.  
The results of the study are presented in Chapter 4. The confirmatory factor 
analysis failed to confirm the components of symptom clusters of PTSD as reported 
in DSM. The results of the exploratory factor analysis suggest a new three symptoms 
cluster for the sample (reexperiencing/arousal, cognitive impairments, and numbing).  
Hierarchical regression analysis revealed significant relationships between PTSD and 
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level of exposure, rumination, suppression, clarity in discriminating feelings, and 
mood repair as hypothesized. However, age, gender, reappraisal, and attention to 
emotional experiences were not found to be associated with PTSD. These results are 
discussed in light of the related literature and the limitations of the study are 
presented in the Chapter 5.         
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CHAPTER II 
Literature Review 
2.1 NATURAL DISASTER STUDIES 
Each year 100,000 to 1,000,000 earthquakes happen around the world 
(McCaughey, Hoffman, & Llewellyn, 1995).  Statistically calculated trends covering 
the last two decades indicate that both the number and the magnitude of the effects of 
natural disasters have been increasing and will continue to increase at a rapid rate in 
the near future (Kalayjian, 1995).  The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates 
that between the years 1964 and 1983, natural disasters throughout the world killed 
nearly 2,500,000 people and left an additional 750,000,000 people injured (PAHO, 
1993; in Kalayjian, 1995). Furthermore, these disasters affect the economic, social, 
medical, and psychological well-being of the communities in which they occur. 
The affects of natural disasters are seen at the individual, family, community, 
and national level. Kalayjian (1995) classifies the types of losses due to natural 
disasters into three types. The first type of loss is called direct loss, which includes a 
decrease in environmental safety and physical damage, such as victims’ injuries and 
damage to the infrastructure of public services, hospitals, industry, and commerce. 
The second type of loss is called indirect loss, which includes the social and 
economic effects of a disaster.  Examples of this second type of loss are damages to 
transportation, communication, and media infrastructures in the social area, and 
damages to the economy, trade, production, and tourism in the economical area. The 
third type of loss is called undetected loss, which refers to damages that cannot be 
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identified at the time of the disaster or immediately afterwards. These damages can be 
the loss of a community’s cohesion, continuity, harmony, positive self-image, and 
historical documents.  The monetary value of these undetected losses is difficult to 
calculate or measure. 
A devastating natural disaster occurred in Turkey on August 17, 1999, when 
an earthquake registering 7.4 on the Richter scale hit the northwest part of Turkey, 
centering on the cities of Istanbul, Golcuk, Izmit, Adapazari, Yalova, and Kocaeli.  
This area is the industrial heart of Turkey and historically the most attractive area for 
domestic immigrants, and therefore is the most populated area. The worst part of this 
devastating earthquake was that it hit at 3:01 a.m. when the victims were at home 
sleeping. People were buried alive in collapsing apartment buildings. On November 
13, another earthquake registering 5.8 in magnitude hit the same area. This 
earthquake caused already damaged buildings to collapse and injure people.  This 
time, many of the deaths were due to heart attacks, and many people jumped in panic 
from their windows and balconies. Official estimates of the death toll for the first 
earthquake were in excess of 17,000, while 1.5 million people were made homeless. 
This earthquake was classified as one of the six deadliest earthquakes of the century 
(Newsweek, 1999). 
Earthquakes may be the scariest of the different types of natural disasters due 
to their unpredictable nature. Predictions of time, location, and intensity are limited to 
the crudest estimates, which leads to feelings of helplessness.   
Revel (1996) examines the numerous definitions of disasters that can be found 
in the literature, and reports that a helpful operational definition is as follows: 
Environmental disruption exceeds the adjustment capacity of the affected 
community, thus requiring external assistance. It may apply to natural 
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disasters and accidents, to communities as well as to individuals. It also works 
for physical events as well as psychological stress or trauma, in which the 
overwhelming calls for an external assistance through various symptoms 
(p.290). 
McCaughey, Hoffman, and Llewellyn (1995) summarize the eight 
characteristics of an earthquake as follows: 1) unpredictable (unknown when one will 
occur); 2) instantaneous (sudden death, injury and destruction); 3) concentrated (high 
velocity destructive evolution); 4) uncontrollable (its acute effects cannot be 
modified); 5) powerful (causes a wide area of destruction); 6) elusive (cause is 
unseen; only the effects are seen); 7) total involvement (encompassing all senses); 
and, 8) unexpected continuation (aftershocks cause vigilance). 
Revel (1996) summarizes that the number of people affected by natural 
disasters is increasing. To say that natural disasters are among the main causes, if not 
the main cause, of traumatic stress in the world is not an overstatement. This point is 
frequently overlooked, as the attention immediately after a disaster is focused only on 
meeting the most essential material needs, such as food, water, sanitation, shelter, 
medical assistance, and communication, and not on essential psychological needs. 
2.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONS TO NATURAL DISASTERS 
The responses to traumatic events can be seen as behavioral and 
psychological. Holloway and Ursano (1984) suggest that these responses are not 
random, rather they have a predictable structure, and time course and posttraumatic 
symptoms are transitory for most survivors; however, the effects of a disaster linger 
long after its occurrence and regenerate due to new experiences that remind the 
person of the past traumatic events (Green & Solomon, 1995). 
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Mass natural disasters differ from other types of traumatic events primarily 
due to the total destruction of the physical and social environments. After a major 
earthquake, for instance, survivors cannot go back to their previous environment 
because their houses may have collapsed, their family members and/or neighbors may 
have been killed, and their whole community may have been disrupted (Kowalski & 
Kalayjian, 2000). In disaster situations, people feel completely overwhelmed. The 
survivors’ lives are threatened, and even if they are not physically affected, they are 
subject to intense stress. 
The American Red Cross Manual on Disaster Health Services I (1992) defines 
five stages that survivors of disaster are likely to experience. 
1. Initial impact stage: The survivors experience increased anxiety and 
fear. 
2. Heroic stage: The survivors display altruistic behaviors. They help 
each other anyway that they can. 
3. Honeymoon stage: The survivors at this stage are happy that they 
survived. They feel that they are special and important, especially as 
they receive special attention and aid from domestic and/or 
international governments, private organizations and so on.  
4. Disillusionment stage: At this stage the survivors experience increased 
resentment, frustration, and anger at officials and agencies for failing 
to provide assistance in a more timely manner. 
5. Reconstruction and acceptance stage: The survivors start planning to 
reconstruct their life and accept the need of taking some responsibility 
for personal problems. 
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These stages are not linear and they may overlap. Also, the amount of time 
spent in each stage may be different from one person to another (Kowalski & 
Kalayjian, 2000). 
Shore, Tatum, and Vollmer (1999) state that there are at least three types of 
interpretative approaches to disaster research: 1) the psychiatric approach, which 
attempts to define the extent to which disaster victims have suffered from significant 
mental illness; 2) the behavioral approach, which focuses on behavioral responses to 
disaster as a group process and social adaptation to disaster stress, assuming minimal 
negative mental health consequences to individuals; and, 3) interpersonal network 
approach, which stresses the disruption of interpersonal and social linkages and the 
use of support systems in response and recovery. 
Shore, Tatum, and Vollmer’s (1999) study of the Mount St. Helen volcanic 
eruption disaster experience on May 18, 1980, uses the psychiatric approach and 
therefore their goal is to emphasize the significance of stress-induced psychiatric 
disorders among disaster victims. They interviewed a total of 1,025 people 42 months 
after the disaster and categorized the people into three groups: high exposure, low 
exposure, and control. By using the Diagnostic Interview Schedule, they defined three 
major psychiatric disorders that were manifested in the high and low exposure group: 
single-episode depression, generalized anxiety disorders, and ‘Mount St. Helens-
related’ posttraumatic stress disorder. Their findings reveal significant differences in 
subsequent psychiatric morbidity among these three groups when exposed to varying 
levels of disaster stress. These differences are reflected in the differential onset of the 
three specific psychiatric disorders. The observed onset pattern is consistent with a 
dose-response relationship to disaster stress and is related to property loss or death of 
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a family member or close relative due to the disaster. The people in the high exposure 
group are found to be more vulnerable to developing further traumatic stress. 
Similar emotional reactions to mass disaster are reported by Jones (2000) after 
the 1994 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The most 
obvious symptoms manifested by the survivors of this event were hypervigilence, 
hypersensitivity, recurrent and intrusive recollection of the event, distressing dreams, 
intense psychological stress at exposure to internal and/or external cues, and 
physiological reaction on exposure to cues. Fears of darkness, loud noises, smoke, 
and strangers were common. Feelings were dulled and interest in daily activities was 
lost.  People felt hopeless about the future. Sleep disturbance, loss of appetite and 
irritability were often reported by survivors. Anger, frustration, confusion, a sense of 
life being meaninglessness, and survivor guilt were affecting these people.  
Lifton and Olson (1999) interviewed 43 victims of the Buffalo Creek disaster 
and reported that people who were exposed to this disaster displayed some or all of 
the following reaction patterns. The first pattern identified was called death imprint 
and related death anxiety. Expressions of death anxiety consists of vivid memories 
and images of the dying and massive destruction, anxiety and fear related to these 
memories and images, sleep disturbances, fear of crowds, and terrifying dreams that 
occurred regularly even 27 months after the disaster. According to most victims, this 
type of death and being vulnerable to this type of death was unacceptable. Their 
surrounding environment was threatening and deadly rather than life sustaining. 
The second pattern identified was called death guilt.  Death guilt was painful 
“self-condemnation over having lived” while others died. Even 30 months after the 
disaster, victims reported that they could or should have saved other people who died.  
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However, this feeling is usually accompanied by feelings of relief and gratitude that 
they survived.  Perhaps, because of this feeling of gratitude, the survivors never 
forgave themselves for having survived; rather they may have suppressed this feeling 
of relief and/or replaced it with other emotions such as rage and apathy.   
The third pattern identified was psychic numbing, which the authors claim 
may be the most universal reaction to a disaster.  The psychic numbing response is 
also called the “disaster response.”  When affected by psychic numbing, people 
suppress all feelings and may be in a state of withdrawal and depression. The 
common responses related to psychic numbing for the survivors of the Buffalo Creek 
disaster were memory lapses, general sluggishness, unresponsiveness, and confusion 
about details of one’s immediate surroundings and the passage of time in general. 
The fourth pattern identified was impaired human relationships, and consists 
especially of need and nurturing conflicts as well as strong suspicions of the 
counterfeit. According to the authors, it was clear that the Buffalo Creek victims were 
craving human support and comfort but at the same time they were unable to relate to 
other people. They were often full of rage and hostility.  
The fifth pattern identified was the struggle to understand the significance and 
meaning of the disaster.  This pattern was a search for the reasons and answers to why 
questions. The authors discussed that in most natural disaster situations, people might 
attribute the disaster to God’s will or their sin, but in the Buffalo Creek case people 
reasoned that God had nothing to do with it. The Buffalo Creek disaster was not 
caused by nature, but by man. The survivors believed that a small number of people 
were responsible for the collapse of the dam. 
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This fifth pattern makes it clear that there are differences between human-
made and natural disasters in terms of people’s understanding or interpretation of the 
traumatic events. Lifton and Olson’s (1999) discussion in this sense is very 
significant in terms of how Buffalo Creek disaster survivors felt about the cause of 
this disaster. Survivors believed that their lives meant nothing to the company that ran 
the dam. In the case of human-made disasters such as war, airplane crashes, personal 
assaults and so on, the survivors’ sense of self worth and dignity were undermined. 
One of the Buffalo Creek survivors stated, “we were less than human in the eyes of 
the company.”  
In the case of natural disasters, the traumatic event affects the whole 
community. After the disaster, the presence of other survivors “sharing the same fate 
and reacting in a similar fashion helps to validate one’s own assessments and 
judgments” (Kaniasty & Norris, 1999; p.29). Several researchers (e.g., Dynes & 
Drabek, 1994; Taylor, 1991) discussed that contrary to reports by the media and 
psychological professionals, survivors of mass disasters tend to regain their rational 
thinking and sense of determination rather quickly. They immerse themselves in the 
process of helping others. Survivors often do not have time for their own crises. 
Kaniasty & Norris (1999) observe “as long as they are physically capable, they rush 
to help others; victims are doers –there is no place for bystanders.” (p.29). Butcher 
and Dunn (1989) explain that being around other survivors contributes to the recovery 
process. Victims who are isolated from others will more likely develop 
psychopathologic reactions. Perhaps being part of a group is less threatening and 
confusing, and thus more tolerable, and triggers less existential questions in terms of 
justice and fairness in the world (Kaniasty & Norris, 1999).  
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Several researchers also talk about the positive effects of traumatic events. 
Raphael and Wilson (1993) state that exposure to trauma can help people move 
toward health and that individuals may rearrange their values and reprioritize their 
life goals, with an emphasis on the importance of family, friends, and country 
(Ursano, Fullerton, & Norwood, 2000).  Kalayjian (1995) also states the positive 
changes that are seen after natural disasters: “rebirthing experience, rebuilding of 
communities destroyed or otherwise damaged, developing newer and healthier coping 
skills, adopting a new and more positive meaning in life, helping one another in 
organized volunteer efforts, taking steps towards prevention or reducing the impact of 
disaster, and experiencing existential growth” (p.25). 
Salzer and Bickman (1999) support the idea that contrary to ‘disaster myths’, 
which describes survivors of a disaster as irrational, in shock, panicking, and 
dependent on external aids, disaster survivors do organize very quickly to help each 
other and show heroic/altruistic behaviors following a disaster without any sign of 
shock and dependency. However, they also point out the research findings that report 
increased psychological stress and psychopathology after disasters. Their review of 
previous research (Green, Wilson, & Lindy, 1985; Durkin, Khan, Davidson, Zaman, 
& Stein, 1993) concludes that the emergence of “PTSD symptomatology should not 
be surprising, given that they are viewed as natural reactions to traumatic events and 
should not be considered aberrant or pathological unless they significantly interfere 
with normal functioning” (p. 66).  
Other important points that Salzer and Bickman (1999) make concern the way 
that disaster research is designed, the longevity of psychological distress following 
disasters, and the impact of natural versus human-made disasters.  They point out that 
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lower effect sizes in terms of the disaster-psychopathology relationship will likely be 
found when powerful comparison-group and actual pre-post designs are used.  For 
instance, effect sizes were found to be lower when researchers used the same measure 
for their pre-post designs and pre-testing was done before the disasters, as opposed to 
asking participants to remember their functioning before the disaster. In these cases, 
participants are more likely to be biased about their functioning. Pre-event data has a 
critical impact on determining the effects of disasters. Several studies that obtained 
data on the psychopathology of survivors before a disaster suggested that disasters are 
more likely to contribute to the severeness of an existing psychopathology than to 
create a new psychopathology (Smith, Robins, Przybeck, Goldring, & Solomon, 
1986). Similarly, lower effect sizes are found for longer time periods between pre and 
post measures. Rubonis and Bickman (1991) reported a negative relationship between 
the length of time (between the disaster and measure) and effect size estimates. The 
severity of the traumatic effects were found to decrease over time (Freedy, Saladin, 
Kilpatrick, Resnick, & Saunders, 1994);  however, a reverse relationship was  found 
for human-made disasters (Baum & Davidson, 1985).  
In summary, the existing research reports both positive and negative impacts 
for disasters. The studies indicate the difficulties of conducting research in disaster 
areas and the inconsistencies in the literature resulting from different researchers 
using different methodologies. Clearly, all survivors of traumatic events manifest 
psychological problems to some degree; however, not all of these problems are 
pathological.  Some people also report positive benefits, such as learning important 
lessons and identifying more fulfilling life goals.  However, survivors do tend to be 
more susceptible to further trauma, especially when faced with another source of 
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stress in their life.  Several trauma related psychological problems are reported as 
common psychiatric responses to disasters, such as major depression, substance 
abuse, generalized anxiety disorder, adjustment disorders, acute stress disorders, grief 
reactions, family violence, and the symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder. Any 
extraordinary stressor such as war, physical and/or sexual assault, accidents, a natural 
disaster and a human-made disaster can cause these traumatic reactions. Van der 
Kolk, Hart, and Burbridge (1995) state that  
mirroring the confusion and disbelief of people whose basic assumptions are 
shattered by traumatic experiences, the psychiatric profession periodically has 
been fascinated by trauma, followed by sudden disbelief in the importance of 
trauma in the genesis of psychopathology (p.1).   
2.3 POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 
2.3.1 Clinical Definition of Posttraumatic Stress Disorders 
One of the main focuses of this study is identifying the symptoms of 
posttraumatic stress disorder. The survivors of traumatic events commonly report 
PTSD symptoms and the PTSD diagnosis is commonly given by mental health 
professionals nationally and internationally. As a result of documentation from a large 
amount of research, posttraumatic stress disorder was just recently included in DSM-
III and DSM-IV as a separate disorder. It is important to note that this inclusion was 
seen as an important milestone in the field due to the social and political implications 
for many trauma survivors. Yehuda and McFarlane (1995) stated that the inclusion of 
PTSD in DSM aided efforts to develop a model that might provide more sophisticated 
formulizations about the experiences of traumatized individuals.  
DSM-IV describes the essential features of posttraumatic stress disorder as 
follows:  
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…the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an 
extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event 
that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to 
one’s physical integrity; or witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or 
a threat to the physical integrity of another person; or learning about an 
unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of death or injury 
experienced by a family member or other close associate (p.424). 
Six diagnostic criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder are listed in DSM-IV: 
A. The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the 
following were present: 
1. the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an 
event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious 
injury, or a threat to physical integrity of self or others 
2. the person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness, or 
horror. Note: In children, this may be expressed instead by 
disorganized or agitated behavior. 
B. The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in one (or more) of 
the following ways: 
1. recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, 
including images, thoughts, or perceptions. Note: In young 
children, repetitive play may occur in which themes or aspects of 
the trauma are expressed. 
2. Recurrent distressing dreams of the event. Note: In children, 
there may be frightening dreams without recognizable content. 
3. Acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring 
(includes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, 
hallucinations, and dissociative flashback episodes, including those 
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that occur on awakening or when intoxicated). Note: In young 
children, trauma-specific reenactment may occur. 
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with trauma and numbing of 
general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by 
three (or more) of the following: 
1. efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversation associated 
with the trauma 
2. efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse 
recollections of the trauma 
3. inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma 
4. markedly diminished interest or participation in significant 
activities 
5. feeling of detachment or estrangement from others 
6. restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving feelings) 
7. sense of foreshortened future (e.g., does not expect to have a 
career, marriage, children, or a normal life span) 
D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the 
trauma), as indicated by two (or more) of the following: 
1. difficulty falling or staying asleep 
2. irritability or outbursts of anger 
3. difficulty concentrating 
4. hypervigilnace 
5. exaggerated startle response  
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E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in Criteria B, C, D) is more 
than 1 month. 
F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in 
social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. 
Specify if: 
⋅ Acute: if duration of symptoms is less than 3 months 
⋅ Chronic: if duration of symptoms is 3 months or more 
Specify if: 
⋅ With Delayed Onset: if onset of symptoms is at least 6 months 
after the stressor. 
Several researchers noted two main concerns regarding the PTSD diagnosis.  
First, although criterion A states that exposure to the traumatic event is a 
criterion for PTSD, many people do not manifest pathological symptoms after a 
traumatic event. McMilllen, North, and Smith’s (2000) reviewed the literature on the 
rates of diagnosable PTSD cases and found that these rates vary from one traumatic 
event to another.  According to their review, the lowest rates of PTSD measured by 
structured diagnostic interview schedules were around 4 to 8% of those affected by 
natural disasters such as floods, volcanoes, mud slides, and tornadoes. The highest 
rates of PTSD were from 29 to 54% of those affected by technological accidents, rape 
cases, and criminal disasters that entailed large numbers of fatalities and exposure to 
grotesque scenes. Thus, exposure to traumatic events by itself may not cause 
psychological problems.  
Second, several researchers raised questions about the validity of the PTSD 
symptom structures reported by DSM: reexperiencing (criterion B), 
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numbing/avoidant (criterion C), and arousal (criterion D). These symptom structures 
of PTSD were investigated in terms of their fit to different types of traumatic events 
and populations, and their results combined with other clinical observation efforts 
indicate substantial agreement in terms of the manifestation of the 17 symptoms that 
cluster into three groups (e.g., Horowitz, Wilner, Kaltreider, & Alvarez, 1980; 
Cordova, Studts, Hann, Jacobsen, & Andrykowski, 2000; McMillen, North, & Smith, 
2000). However, inconsistent results were reported regarding the components of the 
reexperiencing (criterion B), numbing/avoidant (criterion C), and arousal (criterion 
D) and their applicability to different populations and to different types of trauma 
experiences (e.g., Anthony, Lonigan, Hecht, 1999).   
Since most diagnostic tools were developed based on DSM’s formulation of 
PTSD, factor analysis has been widely used to test the PTSD symptom clusters (e.g., 
Buckley, Blanchard, & Hickling, 1998; Silver & Iacono, 1984; Vreven, Gudanowski, 
King, & King, 1995; Cordova, Studts, Hann, Jacobsen, and Andrykowski, 2000). For 
example, King, Leskin, King, and Weathers (1998) examined the factor structures of 
the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale developed based on DSM’s 
conceptualization of PTSD with a sample of 524 male military veterans and 
concluded that a four factor structure model of re-experiencing, effortful avoidance, 
emotional numbing, and hyper arousal is the best fit model instead of DSM’s three 
factor structure. However, Steven, Klaus, Koch, Crockett, and Passey (1998) reported 
two factors (intrusions/avoidance and hyperarousal/numbing) as a result of their 
exploratory factor analyses of 103 motor vehicle accident victims and 419 UN 
peacekeepers in Bosnia. Their results were confirmed by confirmatory factor analysis 
of 217 motor accident survivors by Buckley, Blanchard, and Hickling (1998). 
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Another factor structure (arousal, avoidance, intrusion, and numbing) was reported by 
Sack, Seeley, and Clarke (1997) for a sample of 194 Khmer adolescent refuges.  The 
symptom structure of PTSD in survivors of cancer was examined by Cardova, Studts, 
Hann, Jacobsen, and Andrykowski (2000). Their results provided partial support for 
the DSM model (reexperiencing, numbing/avoidance, and arousal). However, they 
warned that avoidance and numbing should be separate factors. 
 Anthony, Lonigan, and Hecht (1999) utilized confirmatory factor analysis to 
examine eight alternate models of PTSD symptom structures that were reported by 
previous researchers. These models were 1) general posttraumatic stress, which 
claims one single factor; 2) intrusion/avoidance and arousal/numbing; 3) 
intrusion/arousal and avoidance/numbing; 4) intrusion/arousal, avoidance, and 
numbing; 5) intrusion, arousal/avoidance, and numbing; 6) intrusion, 
numbing/avoidance, and arousal (DSM model); 7) intrusion/avoidance, numbing, and 
arousal; and finally, 8) intrusion, arousal, numbing, and avoidance model. Their 
results are based on a sample of 5,664 child and adolescent victims of the Hurricane 
Hugo disaster and suggest another model: intrusion/active avoidance, 
numbing/passive avoidance, and arousal. This study confirmed that DSM’s model is 
not the best model; in fact, it is inferior to other models as previous studies suggested. 
In sum, none of the factor analytic studies summarized above replicated the 
PTSD symptom structure reported in DSM. The previous factor analytic studies 
revealed different underlying factors for different traumatic experiences.  
These inconsistent results provoked more discussion about the characteristics 
of DSM’s symptom structures. For example, McMillen, North, and Smith (2000) 
suggested that the DSM criteria might be too stringent; especially criterion C, and 
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avoidance and numbing experiences might not be seen at the same time. In their 
review article, Davidson and Foa (1991) reported that avoidance symptoms are not 
commonly reported after natural disasters. In addition to several methodological 
issues, they speculated that this result might be because “a strong sense of community 
cohesion reduces avoidance after large scale disasters” (p.353). Other researchers 
noted that these inconsistencies might be a result of serious life events, such as 
developmental arrests, personality styles, cultural premises, and networks of social 
support (Horowitz, Wilner, Kaltreider, Alveraz, 1980).  
Furthermore, despite the fact that DSM is widely used nationally and 
internationally, the potential impact of culture on PTSD symptom structures is not 
reflected in DSM.  As can be seen from the definition, posttraumatic stress disorder is 
different from other disorders defined in DSM in terms of the emphasis on external 
stress sources that lead to the manifestation of PTSD symptoms. Despite the fact that 
several researchers note that since trauma is an external stress, trauma and culture are 
closely related, only a few direct empirical studies have examined the fitness of DSM 
model to different cultures. Jenkins (1996) examined the application of DSM-III’s 
PTSD categories on a sample of Salvadorian women refugees. The psychological 
reactions of these refugees were assessed by several questionnaires and 
anthropological interviews. This study concluded that Salvadorian women’s reactions 
met with PTSD’s criteria A, B, and D, but criterion C was not found to be applicable: 
i.e., feelings of detachment, estrangement, restricted affect, foreshortened future, and 
avoidance types of reactions were not reported by this sample. Additionally, this 
study pointed out that the somatic reactions of these women are not listed in DSM. 
Jenkins (1996) proposes two possible explanations for these results: “a) diagnostic 
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difficulties inherent in observing these particular features (e.g., numbing, avoiding 
trauma related thoughts), or b) restricted cultural validity of the full syndrome as 
currently conceived and as applied to this sample” (p.174). 
The current literature reports no systematic cross-national comparisons of 
PTSD symptom structures. Green (1996) notes the lack of cross-national studies and 
indicates several difficulties to do so beyond the lack of attention to culture in 
psychological research. Among these difficulties, Green (1996) and Marsella et. al. 
(1996) listed several important methodological difficulties (e.g., target sample, use of 
questionnaires, the timing of assessment) as well as social and political difficulties. 
In summary, PTSD symptoms are commonly reported by survivors of 
traumatic events and the PTSD diagnosis is commonly given by mental health 
professionals.  PTSD was first described in DSM in the 1980’s.  It is important to 
note that this inclusion was seen as an important milestone in the field, mostly 
because the classification of PTSD has given voice to many traumatized victims in 
the social and political arenas. Yehuda and McFarlane (1995) stated that the inclusion 
of PTSD in DSM contributed to efforts to develop a model that might provide more 
sophisticated formulizations about the experiences of traumatized individuals. 
However, despite substantial agreement and the validation of 17 PTSD symptoms, 
several questions remain on how these symptoms cluster. Factor analytic studies 
summarized above failed to replicate the PTSD symptom structure reported in DSM. 
In other words, the previous factor analytic studies revealed different underlying 
factors for different traumatic experiences and populations.  
Inconsistent results are reported mostly for the avoidance/numbing symptom 
clusters. It was widely discussed that criterion C (avoidance/numbing) might be too 
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stringent, and that avoidance and numbing might not be seen at the same time (e.g., 
McMillen, North, and Smith, 2000). The numbing response was found to be less 
common for particular types of traumatic events, such as natural disasters, where 
survivors are more likely to receive social support (e.g., Davidson and Foa, 1991). 
Previous research also discussed that the construct of avoidance needs further 
clarification. For example, Anthony, Lonigan, and Hecht (1999) make a distinction 
between active avoidance (e.g., avoiding trauma related thoughts by engaging in 
distractive activities and social interactions) and passive avoidance (withdrawal from 
any activities). Some factor analytic studies found that avoidance may be highly 
correlated to arousal whereas others found that avoidance is correlated with 
reexperiencing symptom clusters. Also, the literature that examines posttraumatic 
reactions suffers from several methodological issues and/or difficulties, such as 
differences in traumatizing events, traumatized populations, and the timing of the 
measurement. Additionally, several variables make deliberations difficult in terms of 
interpretations and implications of the results, such as serious current and previous 
life events, developmental details, personality styles, existence of social support, and 
cultural values and beliefs. 
2.3.2 Risk Factors For Psychological Trauma Reaction 
Exposure to a traumatic event has been identified as a primary predictor of 
traumatic reactions. However, due to variations in PTSD rates, exposure to a 
traumatic event is no longer seen as a sufficient explanation for the development of 
PTSD (Brewin, Andrews, Valentine, 2000). Not every person exposed to a traumatic 
event develops PTSD and/or other psychological disturbances. Why? What makes 
some people more vulnerable to PTSD? More recent research examines several 
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variables that may further explain the development of PTSD. These variables can be 
categorized into three groups: (1) Characteristics of The Traumatic Event; (2) 
Personal Predictors; and, (3) Personality type predictors.  Each of these categories is 
discussed in detail in the following sections. 
2.3.2.1 Characteristics of The Traumatic Event 
As discussed above, the characteristics of the traumatic event has considerable 
impact on people’s reactions to trauma. Human-made trauma causes more severe 
psychological impacts than natural disasters in the long term while natural disasters 
may cause more devastating immediate psychological impacts (Salzer & Bickman, 
1999). Research indicates that the devastating impacts of natural disasters 
substantially decreases after as little as 18 months (Steinglass & Gerrity, 1990). 
Herman (1997) nicely states why this is the case: 
To study psychological trauma is to come face to face both with human 
vulnerability in the natural world and with the capacity for evil in human 
nature. To study psychological trauma means bearing witness to horrible 
events.  When the events are natural disasters or “acts of God,” those who 
bear witness sympathize readily with the victim. But when the traumatic 
events are human design, those who bear witness are caught in the conflict 
between victim and perpetrator. It is morally impossible to remain neutral in 
this conflict. The bystander is forced to take sides. It is very tempting to take 
the side of the perpetrator. All the perpetrator asks is that the bystanders do 
nothing. (p.7) 
The magnitude of the traumatic event is thought to be highly related to the 
severity of the psychological impacts. However, loss of resources (Freedy, Saladin, 
Kilpatrick, Resnick, & Saunders, 1994) and loss of community cohesion and loved 
ones (Lifton & Olson, 1999) may be more meaningful predictors than the physical 
magnitude of the disaster. 
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2.3.2.2 Personal predictors 
Personal predictors include variables such as gender, age, and education level. 
Lewin, Carr, and Webster (1997) found that the 1989 Newcastle (Australia) 
earthquake survivors with lower educational levels reported more traumatic reactions.  
For the present study, age and gender and not education level are the main 
interests. It is important to address how gender and age play roles in psychological 
reactions to disasters. 
Although no previous research focused specifically on examining the 
relationships between disaster and gender, previous research indicates that overall, 
traumatic events have more negative impacts on women (e.g., Yehuda & Davidson, 
2000; Brewin, Andrews, & Valentine, 2000). Research findings relating disaster and 
gender are mostly peripheral in nature.  These findings report a few similar gender 
differences for adult survivors of various disasters. One of the common gender 
differences is that women are more likely to manifest PTSD, anxiety, and depression 
as reactions to traumatic events (Gibbs, 1989; Manuel, Anderson, 1993), whereas 
men display higher levels of aggression and substance abuse (Gibbs, 1989).  
Sattler, Freedy, Anderson, and Kaiser, (1997) suggest that individuals with 
greater role expectations, such as caregivers and parents, might be facing more 
adjustment difficulties after traumatic events. This might be one reason why women 
are more vulnerable to psychological problems, as women are often seen as the 
primary caregiver. Bromberger (1996) discusses that some traits that make one more 
vulnerable to psychological distress are considered to be more characteristic of 
women than men: these traits include low instrumentality, high expressivities, 
sensitivity to the needs and feelings of others, and high tendency to self-focus or 
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ruminate on psychological distress.  Also, these findings are consistent with the fact 
that previous traumatic experiences such as abuse is a primary predictor of other 
psychological problems including PTSD, and that women are more likely to have 
been previously abused.  
However, it is important to note that even though the common finding is that 
women are more likely to develop traumatic stress, research focusing on women’s 
reactions to natural disasters is very limited. Furthermore, most of the knowledge 
about trauma and women comes from research on human made trauma such as 
domestic violence, sexual assaults, and war, and these research findings are 
sometimes inconsistent. Brewin, Andrews, and Valentine (2000) found in their meta-
analysis of risk factors for posttraumatic stress disorder in trauma-exposed adults that 
considerable gender differences exist among civilian populations whereas no gender 
differences are found among combat veterans. Also, some research reports no gender 
differences at all. Additionally, Solomon, Smith, Robins, and Fischbach, (1987) 
report that many men are found to manifest depression and alcohol problems as a 
result of a natural disaster, whereas this natural disaster had no direct effect on 
women. 
Age is another variable that has been reported as a risk factor. Some 
researchers claim that older people (e.g., Cohen & Ahearn, 1980) and children (Belter 
and Shannon, 1993) are more vulnerable to disaster impacts. DSM-IV indicates that 
young children might have symptoms similar to adults, but the manifestation of these 
symptoms might be different. For example, intrusive and recurrent recollections of 
the traumatic events can be observed in children’s play and intense fear/horror, and 
helplessness might be manifested as disorganized or agitated behavior.  
 29
 
Belter and Shannon (1993) found that the direct and immediate psychological 
impact of a disaster is imminent in children and adolescents; however, these 
psychological impacts do not produce diagnosable psychopathology. In the long run, 
most symptoms might disappear depending on several other conditions, such as the 
severity of the traumatic event and level of exposure. Additionally, children and 
adolescents’ subjective interpretation of the trauma is one of the key variables in 
terms of determining the impact of such events (Keppel-Benson & Ollendick, 1993).  
The review of the disaster literature also indicates that traumatic stress 
reactions for children show developmental progression (Green, Korol, Grace, Vary, 
Leonard, Gleser, and Smitson-Cohen, 1991). Green at al. explain that younger 
children typically display a disorganized traumatic state. In this state, children cannot 
understand what is going on very well and their reactions are mostly influenced by 
adults. As children get older, they might show adult like PTSD symptoms and adult 
like understanding of the trauma. 
Research findings on middle age and older populations reveal a more complex 
picture. Although some earlier research simply report that older age groups are more 
vulnerable to natural disasters, most research indicates that older people are more 
resilient than younger people.  In order to examine the reasons for older adults’ 
resiliency, a recent study by Knight, Gatz, Heller, and Bengtson (2000) tested 
maturation and inoculation perspectives on 166 Northridge earthquake survivors 
(ages 30 to 102). According to these authors the maturation hypothesis maintains that 
people develop better coping styles with age while increasing their psychological 
maturity. On the other hand, the inoculation hypothesis maintains that prior exposure 
helps people to develop resiliency and the older people are more likely to have 
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experienced prior traumatic events. The findings of this study indicate no support for 
the maturation hypothesis and only partial support for the inoculation hypothesis with 
regard to depression. The authors further explain that older adults manifest much 
lower levels of emotional distress than younger adults. They also report that the 
resilience of older adults is closely related to their pre-disaster functioning.   
In an earlier and more comprehensive study, Thompson, Norris, and Hanacek 
(1993) compared and contrasted four different perspectives on the relations between 
age and psychological reactions to natural disasters: (1) inoculation perspective; (2) 
resource perspective; (3) exposure perspective; and, (4) burden perspective. The 
authors explain that the exposure perspective maintains that older people are more 
likely to develop more severe psychological responses to natural disasters because 
they are less likely to receive warnings prior to disasters, have a greater reluctance to 
evacuate, experience a greater interference with accustomed patterns of life, 
experience a greater sense of deprivation resulting from their losses, and have a 
greater likelihood of a disaster related injury and economical loss. Likewise, the 
resource perspective maintains that older individuals are more likely to suffer from 
the impacts of natural disasters because their coping capacity deteriorates with age. 
This means that when people get older, they experience more physical health, 
economic, and social problems than younger adults. The inoculation and burden 
perspectives, on the other hand, uphold that older people are less likely to experience 
psychological problems than younger and middle aged people. The inoculation 
perspective states that coping capacity increases with age because older people have 
experienced more traumatic events/stressful life situations and thus they have 
developed more resiliency and better coping capacities. Finally, the burden 
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perspective maintains that older people are less vulnerable to traumatic events 
because they have fewer responsibilities. Unlike the other three perspectives, this 
perspective introduces a curvilinear relationship between age and traumatic reactions. 
According to this perspective, middle-aged people are more likely to be the provider 
for their younger and older family members, such as for their children’s education 
and/or their parents’ well being. Thompson, Norris, and Hanacek (1993) assessed 
these four perspectives using 831 adult survivors 12, 18, and 24 months after 
Hurricane Hugo and reported that there is a curvilinear interaction between the 
exposure to a traumatic event and age, and that the burden perspective is the best 
perspective to explain the relationships between age and psychological consequences 
of the natural disaster. 
 
2.3.3.3 Personality Type Predictors 
According to the literature, rumination and emotional experiences may be 
closely related to traumatic reactions. While the characteristics of the traumatic events 
and the person’s age and gender are considered to be predictive factors, rumination 
and emotional experiences are considered not only as predictive factors but also as 
maintaining psychological factors.  
Rumination is defined as a personality characteristic that plays a crucial role 
in people’s emotional support seeking after major life events (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Davis, 1999). In the case of traumatic events, “People with a ruminative coping style 
think repetitively and passively about their own emotional reactions to a trauma, 
focusing on their symptoms of distress (“I feel so lousy”; “I just can’t concentrate”) 
and worrying about the meanings of their distress (“Will I ever get over this?”…)” 
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(Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999, p. 802). Nolen-Hoeksema and Davis also state that 
their definition of ruminative style differs from other trauma researchers as they 
define ruminations as “an individual-difference” rather than as “a process variable.” 
The authors state that 
…(other) theorists have tended to operationalize ruminations as intrusive 
thoughts primarily about the trauma, whereas our conception of rumination 
also highlights thoughts about one’s emotional reactions to the trauma or to 
more chronic stressors, which may sometimes be intrusive…for example, 
ruminators have many thoughts such as “I’m a wreck,” “I cannot cope,” and 
“What’s wrong with me? (p.802).  
 
Most of the existing research on rumination emphasizes its relation to 
depression and anxiety disorders rather than PTSD. What we know from the 
depression/anxiety studies is that a ruminative personality is one of the essential 
factors for maintaining and exacerbating a depressive mood, anxiety, and pessimistic 
thinking (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema (1993) explain 
that people with ruminative styles tend to experience increased or sustained and 
longer durations of negative affect, to focus on the negative sides of events, and to be 
more pessimistic about themselves and their future. Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema 
(1993) also report that ruminators are less likely to show a willingness to engage in 
activities that may help them to reduce their depressive mood by believing that 
rumination is the way of understanding their depression. Moreover, it has been 
suggested that ruminators tend to experience more interpersonal problems 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995) and tend to have poorer problem solving 
skills due to negative self-criticism, self-blame for problems, and reduced self-
confidence and perceived control (Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg 1999). 
 33
 
In one of the few studies on trauma and rumination, Nolen-Hoeksema and 
Morrow (1991) examined the affects of rumination on PTSD after the 1989 Loma 
Prieta earthquake using 137 students and concluded that rumination is one of the 
predictors of traumatic stress and depression, even after controlling for pre-disaster 
depressive mood and PTSD symptoms. They explain that students with ruminative 
response styles are less likely to initiate certain activities that distract themselves from 
negative moods but purposely focus on their negative mood and its implications. 
Moreover the authors discuss that ruminators are less likely to disclose to others their 
traumatic experiences and thus they are more prone to long-term negative reactions to 
trauma. However, interestingly they found that students who talked about the 
earthquake neither gained benefit nor were hurt by it. This is a significant finding 
because sharing traumatic experiences has been seen as the opposite of ruminating on 
the traumatic experience. Based on this finding, Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) 
speculated that in the case of natural disasters people are more likely to feel 
comfortable talking about the traumatic event, as all earthquake survivors talked 
about it for the first 10 days following the earthquake. Therefore, sharing was not 
found to be one of the predictors.  
This speculation is reminiscent of Pennebaker and Harber’s (1993) “a social 
stages” model that they created based on the disclosure behaviors of Loma Prieta 
Earthquake survivors and Dallas residents during and after the Persian Gulf War. In 
this study, Pennebaker and Harber measured how much people talk and think about 
these two incidents over time and concluded that 2 to 3 weeks after the events people 
talk and think about them openly. They called this first time period “the emergency 
stage.” After this stage, the authors observed a sharp decrease in people’s talking 
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behavior. In this stage that was called “the inhibition stage”, people almost stop 
talking about the events but continued thinking about it with slightly decreasing 
frequency for approximately six weeks. In the last stage called “the adaptation stage”, 
people were observed to be neither talking nor thinking about the events. Even though 
Pennebaker and Harber (1993) state that it is not clear why people stopped talking but 
continued to think about the earthquake and the Gulf War during the inhibition stage, 
they do note that this is the stage that people experienced negative moods, arguments, 
dreams, and display other adverse reactions that are typical marks of posttraumatic 
reactions. 
Why do people not share their emotions and/or thoughts about the traumatic 
events that create emotional upheaval? One possible explanation is people’s concern 
for social disapproval. Wegner and Lane (1995) claim that people keep secrets 
because they are afraid of “ostracism, retaliation, derision, maniacal laughter, armed 
intervention” (p.26). When trauma survivors tell their stories, they expect affirmation 
for their understanding of trauma and that what they did as a reaction to the trauma 
was appropriate (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999). However, society does not 
always provide a supportive environment for trauma survivors and such environments 
make disclosure even more difficult. Herman (1997) argues that listening to trauma 
creates discomfort for listeners as they may be overwhelmed with the nature of the 
traumatic event and thus they may experience difficulties staying calm and 
clearheaded.    
In fact, the existing experimental research findings show that sharing plays 
just as an important role as the social/cultural atmosphere in reducing both 
psychological distress (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999) and somatic complaints 
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(e.g., Pennebaker, 1995). Major traumatic events have intense and long lasting 
impacts on emotions (Pennebaker, 1995). People may deal with these intense 
emotions by expressing them, which may be facilitated during the course of 
conversation and writing letters/diaries (Rime, 1985). 
However, Kennedy-Moore and Watson’s (2001) review of research on 
emotional expression unfolds "the paradox of distress expression."  They explained 
that expression of negative emotions can be perceived as a sign of distress as well as a 
sign of coping with the distress. In this study, two distinct types of expression-related 
personality traits are introduced. The first type of personality trait involves a high 
threshold for stress and a strong tendency to inhibit emotional reactions. People with 
this trait are less likely to be expressive simply because they do not have the tendency 
to react strongly to distressing situation and/or they can easily inhibit their reactions. 
People with the second type of personality trait have a low threshold for stress and are 
more open to talking about their feelings and thus they are more likely to show strong 
expressiveness about emotional stimuli. The authors establish that people of both 
expression-related personality traits are prone to psychological difficulties. People 
who tend to restrain their emotions are more likely to experience poorer 
psychological and physical well-being as discussed above.  Expressive people tend to 
hold pessimistic outlooks and are more likely to be overly sensitive to stressful 
situations. These people are also more likely to experience interpersonal difficulties 
because listeners may become overwhelmed with their emotional disclosure. The 
conclusions of this study, however, do emphasize the importance of disclosure as a 
way of reducing distress, gaining better insight, and developing better interpersonal 
relationships under specific circumstances. The authors suggest that expressiveness 
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can be the most helpful “in the context of a supportive relationship, if it involves an 
intermediate level of intensity, and when it is accompanied by expressions of positive 
emotions” (p.16) within the comfort level and willingness of people who are 
expressing and listening.       
Therefore, as a result of personality features and/or social circumstances 
where emotional inexpressiveness is encouraged, people in stressful situations 
“naturally” utilize emotional regulations to minimize the intensity of their negative 
emotions (e.g., Petrie, Booth, & Pennebaker, 1998). Gross (1998) describes emotion 
regulation as 
the process by which individuals influence which emotions they have, when 
they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions. 
Emotion regulatory process may be automatic or controlled, conscious or 
unconscious, and may have their effects at one or more points in the emotion 
generative process. (p.274) 
Emotional experience is the key element for the formulation of PTSD. The 
main struggle for trauma survivors is that while they try to numb themselves or try to 
avoid any trauma related thoughts that otherwise elicit intense negative emotions, 
they also suffer from intrusive trauma related thoughts.  
Newly emerging literature brings explanations for individual differences in 
emotion regulation in the case of trauma. This literature relies on the extensive 
emotion literature that examines individuals’ emotional experiences and their 
subjective perceptions of these emotions. Mayer, Salovey, Gomberg-Kaufman, and 
Blainey (1991) discuss that “the experience of mood is broader than its emotional 
content alone” (p.100). The experience of mood also involves the process in which 
thoughts, beliefs, and values about emotional experiences effect emotion regulation 
processes. In their study, a new model, the “multi domain approach” and a new 
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measure that integrates both “emotion-related” and “emotion-management-related” 
experiences are introduced.  According to these authors, this model reflects that meta-
mood experiences of mood, emotion-related mood experiences (including physical, 
emotional, and cognitive aspects of emotions) and emotion-management-related 
mood experiences (thoughts of action, suppression, and denial aspects of emotion 
management) take place simultaneously.  
Solovay, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, and Palfai (1997) emphasize that 
individuals differ in terms of their meta-mood skills and their way of processing 
meta-mood experiences because coping with stressful experience relies on a capacity 
to “discriminate, attend, and regulate” feelings. More specifically, even though 
cognition and emotion are independently functioning components, they work as 
interdependent response structures in a stressful situation. 
Therefore, individuals regulate and attend to their emotional responses to 
trauma based on their thoughts/beliefs about emotions. Solovay et al. (1997) 
conducted an experimental study with 78 students who watched a video clip 
consisting of images of drunk driving, traffic accidents, emergency rooms, and 
victims’ descriptions of their accident.  The students filled out several questionnaires 
before and after the video clip.  These researchers examined relationships among 
negative and positive thoughts, rumination, and meta-mood traits (clarity in 
discrimination of feelings, attention to feelings, and mood repair). They found 
evidence that meta-mood traits, especially clarity in discrimination of feeling, 
mitigates against the negative impacts of stressful situations. Clarity and repair were 
found to be closely related to reduced rumination and negative and intrusive thoughts, 
whereas attention to feeling was found to have less affect on these variables. They 
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explained that this might be due to their instructions to students to pay close attention 
to their thoughts and emotions during the experiment.   
In summary, traumatic reactions may be closely related to characteristics of 
traumatic events as well as characteristics of the survivors, such as level of exposure, 
type of loss, age, gender, educational level, rumination, and emotional experiences. 
These variables are the interest of this study because their impact on traumatic 
reactions to natural disasters either has not been studied or if they have, the results are 
inconsistent. Moreover, these variables were previously examined independently 
using different types of samples, such as all women or all men, who were exposed to 
different types of traumatic events, such as sexual assault, war, or a traffic accident. 
In some cases, research participants were not trauma survivors at all, rather 
participants’ reactions were assessed in an artificially created stressful situation. 
Furthermore, these variables have not been examined in the context of the 
population’s culture. These predictors as well as general human reactions to traumatic 
event were examined in western cultures; or more specifically, in North American 
culture. This study aims to bring these independently examined variables together and 
examine their associations with PTSD in a different cultural context. In the next 
section, some of the cognitive and emotional processing theories regarding the 
development of PTSD are integrated. These theories were selected because they 
specifically discuss the relations among PTSD symptoms with regard to cognitive and 
emotional factors that contribute to the development of PTSD. 
2.3.3 Cognitive Theories on The Development of PTSD 
Cognitive processing models assume that individuals enter into novel 
situations with preexisting mental schemata or memory networks. These schemata 
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contain detailed information of the individual’s past experiences as well as 
assumptions and expectations regarding future events, the world, and the self. New 
information is evaluated, interpreted and assimilated based on these preexisting 
schemata. These evaluation, interpretation, and finally integration processes may take 
a long time and may create stress if the new information is inconsistent with the 
preexisting schema. The more inconsistent the new information and the preexisting 
schema, the larger the resulting stress. In traumatic events, the new information is 
often too contradictory and confrontational, and thus too threatening. In some cases, 
individuals either alter their preexisting schemata according to the new information or 
attempt to change the new information in order to integrate the threat-related 
information into their preexisting schemata. These attempts require psychological 
confrontations that create severe distress.  Therefore, trauma survivors have a strong 
desire to avoid or escape from trauma reminders such as thoughts and external clues. 
Until this information is assimilated and integrated into existing views of the world, it 
is stored in the active memory and will continue to produce intrusive and emotionally 
upsetting recollections. In other words, attempts to assimilate this threatening 
information requires revisits to those very same aversive stimuli that one tries to 
avoid, suppress and/or numb himself/herself to cope with the stress created by the 
trauma related recollections.   
Wegner and Lane (1995) introduce a model that explains the development of 
psychological disorders as a result of suppression, which in effect is creating a mental 
control strategy to overcome trauma-induced stress. According to this model, thought 
suppression goes hand in hand with intrusive thoughts in a cyclical repetitive manner. 
Wegner and Lane (1995) explain two cognitive processes, the operator and the 
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monitor processors, which are responsible for intrusive thoughts as a result of thought 
suppression. The operator is a process of shifting attention to anything other than the 
unwanted thought. During this process the monitor process is activated in which 
unwanted thoughts are automatically sought and once the unwanted thoughts are 
discovered, the operator process is activated in order to suppress the unwanted 
thought. It is further explained that even though the operator process is dominant 
most of the time, under the conditions of cognitive load, the monitor process gains 
more control. “When the automatic processing becomes the default response, as is the 
case under high load, the unwanted thought is highlighted and projects into 
consciousness without a stop guard” (p.32). This means that the unwanted thought 
becomes hyper accessible as the effort of suppression is increased. This cycle, called 
the rebound effect (Wegner, 1989), occurs until the unwanted thought is expressed. 
Similar to Wagner and Lane’s (1995) approach, Horowitz (1986) explains that 
trauma creates two opposing sets of internal processes, intrusion and denial, that 
people use to cope with and resolve responses to extreme stressors. The intrusions are 
painful and able to trigger an opponent process of ideational and emotional denial that 
represents the defensive phase of adjustment. The function of emotional numbing is 
to ward off painful memories by minimizing the feelings associated with traumatic 
memories (Litz, Orsillo, Kaloupek, & Weathers, 2000). Thus, in this process, 
individuals with traumatic experiences shift back and forth between generalized 
unresponsiveness and intrusion until resolution of the trauma occurs. 
It has been widely discussed that emotion plays an important role in the 
development of psychological problems. In more general terms, Mahoney (1997) 
introduces six categories of emotional difficulties that contribute to the development 
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of psychological problems: “a) the pain of acute or chronic negative affect, b) 
emotional numbing, c) fear of feeling, d) perplexing emotional reactions, e) emotional 
conflict or ambivalence, and f) experiences (usually painful) associated with 
unfinished or inadequately expressed affects” (p.243).  
Emotions play an important role in the cognitive processes of traumatic 
experiences. The personal meaning of the traumatic experience attaches an emotional 
significance to this cycle and thus thoughts linked with negative emotion are more 
likely to be intrusive and increase the likelihood of rebounding effects (Rachman, 
1982). Roemer and Borkovec (1994) found evidence for Rachman’s (1982) claim in 
their experimental study with a sample of non-clinical college students and described 
a cycle in which  
(1) the suppression of a thought leads that thought to become associated with 
negative emotion (or arousal); (2) a thought associated with negative emotion 
is more likely to be intrusive; and, (3) an intrusive thought is likely to lead to 
further attempts to suppress that thought. This cycle can be reversed when 
repeated exposure to (expression of) the thought leads to habituation of the 
emotional response. A thought no longer associated with negative emotion 
becomes less intrusive, eliminating any need for suppression. (p.7)  
In terms of PTSD, clusters of avoidance/numbing and re-experiencing might 
reflect this ambivalent relationship between avoidance and intrusive thoughts. 
Individuals with PTSD are examined both for their intense negative emotional 
reactions, especially when they are reminded of traumatic incidences, and 
avoidance/numbing emotions as reactions to the traumatic incidences. This means 
that individuals who suffer from PTSD report two different types of problems related 
to their emotions: intense negative emotional reactions, and disinterest in 
circumstances that would otherwise elicit emotion and a lack of ability to experience 
and express emotions (Litz, Orsillo, Kaloupek, & Weathers, 2000).  
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Foa and Kozak (1986) contribute to these approaches by adding the role of 
psychological arousal. Psychological arousal is one of the criterions described in 
DSM-IV and it has substantial effects on cognitive processes due to its effects on 
understanding and interpretations of experiences. These authors elaborate on an 
approach to the development of PTSD based on the fear network theory. According to 
their approach, traumatic experiences cause the development of fear networks in 
memory. This network includes information about cognitive, behavioral, and 
physiological reactions to the initial trauma experiences. Any reminders of traumatic 
experiences can activate the fear network. Activation of the fear network brings 
suppressed thoughts/emotions into the consciousness along with physiological 
arousal. The unpredictable and uncontrollability nature of trauma makes integration 
and assimilation of the traumatic experiences into the preexisting memory network 
difficult.  
Several suggestions have been made on ways to break the cycle of intrusive 
thoughts and the efforts to suppress those intrusive thought.  The inhibition-
confrontation approach explains that disclosure after the traumatic experiences is 
essential to break the cycle because inhibition not only consumes a substantial 
amount of mental energy but also restrains physiological functioning (Pennebaker & 
Beall, 1986). Therefore, active exploration and disclosure of the trauma should result 
in better psychological and physiological functioning by causing cognitive reappraisal 
of traumatic schemata which in turn reduces the intensity of intrusive thoughts and 
ruminations (Greenberg, Wortman, & Stone,1996).  
Similarly, the habituation approach also points out the function of 
expressiveness. This approach (Roemer & Borkovec, 1994) states that disclosure of 
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thoughts and emotions relating to the traumatic event helps to prevent intrusive 
thoughts and ruminations because individuals become accustomed to unwanted 
thoughts through repeated exposure. The basic premises of the habituation approach 
is that habituation results in cognitive restructuring of the schemata related to the 
traumatic experiences due to repeated exposure to traumatic recollections. Therefore, 
disclosure of the traumatic event is necessary to revise the negative affects of the 
traumatic experience so that intrusive thoughts are prevented, emotional responses to 
those thoughts are reduced, the intensity of physiological arousal is reduced and, 
consequently, it is easier to integrate the information from the traumatic experiences. 
As discussed above, people’s thoughts about their emotions also contribute to 
the development of PTSD. Most empirical studies about meta-mood experiences have 
been done with non-clinical samples. In one of the few studies examining the 
relationship between meta-mood experiences and psychological problems, Ansorge, 
Litz, and Orsillo (1996) discuss the impact of thought and beliefs about emotion on 
the development of PTSD.  The authors discuss that attitudes and beliefs about 
emotions may develop prior to or after the traumatic experiences. When people 
encounter traumatic experiences with well-developed beliefs about emotions and 
emotion regulation styles, they understand, interpret, and react to the traumatic 
experiences according to these beliefs, which may hinder or facilitate their coping. 
Ansorge et.al. (1996) conducted a study to test this relationship with Vietnam 
veterans with and without a PTSD diagnosis and reported significant relationships 
between war-induced PTSD and meta-mood experiences. More specifically, they 
found that dysfunctional attitudes (low affect tolerance and seeing emotions as 
worthless, incomprehensible, and uncontrollable) exacerbate the severity of PTSD. 
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In summary, it seems plausible that traumatic events may cause people to be 
stuck in their past as they try to assimilate the new experience into their schemata.  
The incongruent nature of the traumatic experience with their present schemata 
results in severe stress.  In order to cope with this stress, people try to avoid and/or 
suppress any thoughts and feelings that remind them of the traumatic event.  
However, the effort of avoidance/suppression can cause intrusive thoughts as a result 
of rebounding effects. Thus, survivors are unable to move on with their life because 
they continue to go back and forth between suppression of the clues of trauma and 
rumination about the trauma until either the new information or their schemata is 
changed. The process of thought suppression is more difficult when there is an 
emotion attached to the thought. Cognitive processing is facilitated or hindered by 
several factors such as meta-mood and the cultural or social environment in which 
people live. For example, meta-mood experiences may interfere with the cognitive 
process because (Wegner & Pennerbaker, 1993) 
The failure to suppress an unwanted thought can lead to feelings of failure or 
to meta-cognitions in which the individual concludes that she or he is unable 
to control unwanted thoughts. We propose that these meta-cognitions in turn 
may lead to even more frantic attempts at suppression, which also fail until the 
recurring unwanted thought rebounds into a full-blown obsession.(p.123).  
2.4 IMPACTS OF CULTURE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF PTSD 
One of the aims of this study is to bring different cultural perspectives to the 
field. Addressing this issue is important for the sake of practitioners and theoreticians 
of psychology. Psychological science has been claimed to be a by-product of western 
tradition and fashioned by particular cultural and historical conditions (Ardila, 1982; 
Kagitcibasi, 1996; Pawlik, & d’Ydeealle, 1996).  Moreover, psychology has often 
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been criticized as being an oppressive institution, primarily in its unreflective 
perpetuation of the status quo and portrayal of Euro-American norms as universal 
(Sue & Sue, 1990). It is not surprising but rather natural that most western researchers 
assume an individual’s aspiration are closely related to what is valued in their own 
society and thus, western forms of thinking, social organization, and personality 
development have been accepted to be inherently superior (So, 1991). This is an 
extremely important discussion because as Castillo (1997) suggested, since 
mainstream psychology is based on western values and forms of thinking, members 
of other cultures are in danger of being pathologized when they do not conform to 
these western forms of thinking. 
Therefore, there are serious doubts about the concepts and theoretical notions 
that define and describe traumatic stress and other psychological problems as to 
whether or not the western models of understanding human reactions to extreme 
traumatic events are adequate to apply to other societies and cultures. In this section, 
a number of the main theoretical and empirical studies are summarized. These studies 
were chosen because they clearly discuss how indigenous cultures might have 
different points of view on their understanding of mental health than that by 
mainstream psychology professionals. This summary is followed by discussions on 
the impact of culture on the development of PTSD, which is the main focus of the 
present study.  
 
2.4.1 Culture and Understanding of Mental Health     
People understand and interpret their psychological functioning and/or 
dysfunctioning based on their cultural upbringings. For example, Wig (1990) 
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discusses Indian concepts of mental health and their impact on the care of mentally 
ill. His article describes some of the concepts relevant to understanding mental health 
and disease as they are presented in the traditional medical literature of India. Wig 
follows this with a discussion of certain Indian concepts as presented in texts related 
to the three different religions that originated in India: Hinduism, Jainism and 
Buddhism. Subsequently, the author briefly describes the present-day mental health 
services in India. One of his main points is that, unlike in the western intellectual 
tradition, there is no true mind-body differentiation in the Indian philosophies. Even 
the concept of “mind” does not exist in the various Indian languages and 
philosophies. Wig cites three aspects of the definition of mental health in India from 
the work of an Indian academic, Dr. Surya: a mentally healthy person is a) 
comfortable within himself (and thus has no mental illness or infirmity) b) makes 
others around him comfortable (and thus is socially well-adjusted), and c) strives 
continually to evolve to higher spiritual levels. It is emphasized that this definition, 
like all other mental health definitions, reveals the imprint of the cultural value 
system of the person who created the definition. This article therefore provides a good 
example for how the definitions of mental health and indigenous belief systems are 
connected to each other. The western understanding of mental health, in which the 
main focus is individualism and mind/body dualism, is clearly quite different than the 
understanding by Indian lay people. 
Another example of how indigenous culture might affect mental health comes 
from Ng (1993). Ng offers a good illustration of the benefits and means to utilize 
some cultural factors in psychiatric rehabilitation using authentic characteristics of 
Hong Kong’s culture in which, unlike western cultures, the family and/or society is 
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given priority over individuals. He discusses the interrelationship between the effects 
of the physical and social environments and Chinese culture on Chinese psychiatric 
patients. His community approach claims that strong family and social ties should be 
utilized in order to provide secure care and emotional and material support to 
chronically mentally ill patients. The author also outlines some benefits regarding the 
practical effects of this approach, particularly in terms of improving the patients’ 
quality of life and in reducing the cost of treatment. Disadvantages are also discussed. 
For example, the author states that the strong family and social bonding might create 
denial or tolerance of the family member’s important symptoms in order to protect 
the family name and to maintain family stability.  
Luk and Bond (1992) examine the perceived importance of the causes and 
cures of psychological and behavioral problems as evaluated by Hong-Kong Chinese. 
Luk and Bond examine the areas of agoraphobia, anorexia nervosa, compulsive 
gambling, schizophrenia, child abuse, social apathy, lack of civic responsibility, 
neurasthenia, and two mental illnesses which are specific to Hong Kong Chinese: 
using the “back door” (corruption), and shen-kwei, which is a culture-specific 
psychosexual problem. This study relies on the idea that psychiatric disorders differ 
in different cultures in terms of epidemiological symptomatology, illness behavior 
(courses and outcome), illness beliefs, and even psychophysiological experiences 
(Kleinman, 1988).  
This study looked more specifically at what dimensions Hong Kong lay 
people use to perceive causes and cures, and how these dimensions are used to 
perceive causes and cures for different, specific problems. There were two groups of 
participants in the study. With the help of the first group (5 males and 5 females), a 
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questionnaire to measure lay beliefs of Chinese on the causes and cures of 
psychological problems was constructed. This questionnaire was administered to the 
second group of participants (111 male, 111 female). They found two factors 
(environmental/hereditary and social/personal) as the causes and three factors 
(commitment, clinical methods, and protection) as the cures. The authors end by 
discussing their findings with respect to Chinese and western cultures. They suggest 
that Hong Kong Chinese hold an interactionistic model for causality, but make 
internal attributions for cures. This study is important because it extends our 
understanding of the perception of lay people concerning causes and cures of 
psychological problems cross-culturally. However, there was no discussion of the 
implications of their findings in terms of the application of psychological theories. It 
might have been useful if they had included some discussion about what is happening 
in Hong Kong in the field of psychology and how their findings are linked to their 
situation. 
 
2.4.2 Cultural Impacts on The Development of Psychological Trauma  
…the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an 
extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event 
that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to 
one’s physical integrity; or witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or 
a threat to the physical integrity of another person; or learning about an 
unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of death or injury 
experienced by a family member or other close associate. (DSM-IV; p.424) 
As is explicit from this definition of PTSD, trauma is an external stress which 
puts PTSD in a special position. Therefore, it is safe to claim that trauma and culture 
are closely related because trauma is an external stress (Kleber, Figley, & Gersons, 
1995).  This is especially true for natural disasters, which affect whole families and 
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communities and is lived in a social environment. The psychological atmosphere in a 
society is a crucial factor that determines people’s interpretations and it clearly 
facilitates or hinders the process of coping with stressful life events (Kleber, Figley, 
& Gersons, 1995). In his analysis of a devastating flood (the Buffalo Creek disaster), 
Erikson (1976) spoke of two traumas: the first trauma was the occurrence of the 
traumatic event itself and the second trauma was the destruction of community life 
and the loss of social contacts. He emphasized the relevance of the socio-cultural 
nature of the area and its population in understanding the long-term effects. He 
reminds the readers that the survivors of this disaster remained in the area, where they 
were confronted by memories of the disaster every day. Many continued to be 
employed at the same mining company that had built the dam that collapsed and 
caused the flood. The inhabitants were placed in emergency accommodations without 
consideration of the existing relationships between neighbors and relatives, so that the 
community ties, which were essential to them, were severely disturbed.  
As discussed above, the basic premise of cognitive models on the 
development of PTSD is that trauma survivors encounter new experiences involving 
information that is too incongruent with their preexisting schemata. As trauma 
survivors try to assimilate the new information into their schemata, they encounter 
intense distress.  Creamer (1995) discussed that these integration and assimilation 
processes can be facilitated or hindered by the culture in which the traumatized 
person interacts via rituals, customs and so on. A potentially traumatic event’s 
interpretation may be influenced largely by cultural expectations and social norms; 
what is traumatic in one culture or one society may not be so in another. 
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 During the recovery phase, rituals, attitudes, and expectations may facilitate 
or impair the survivor’s ability to come to terms with the experience. In summary, the 
social and cultural context with its belief systems, along with traditional family and 
social role expectations have a substantial impact on an individuals’ understanding of 
and coping with traumatic events. In this sense, concentrating on more interpersonal, 
social, and existential factors can make a valuable contribution to the current 
formalization of posttraumatic reactions; however, almost no empirical cross-cultural 
literature exists on disaster research (Green, 1996) despite the fact that the cultural 
backgrounds of most of the leading names in the field varies widely (Boehnlein, 
1997).         
It is known that culture mediates the experience and expression of emotion. It 
is suspected that members of individualistic cultures might manifest more 
avoidance/numbing symptoms whereas the members of collectivistic cultures might 
manifest more reexperiencing symptoms. However, there is no known cross-cultural 
research on which to base these predictions of how people of different culture 
regulate (express or suppress) their emotions in the case of PTSD, despite the fact that 
emotional suppression and intrusive thoughts are the main determinants of a PTSD 
diagnosis and DSM-IV is the prime diagnostic tool nationally and internationally.   
Although, no systematic cross-cultural study was found, the existing literature 
contains some discussion regarding the universality of traumatic reactions to trauma 
based on independent studies done in different countries. Among them, Green’s 
review of international disaster studies (1996) focuses on natural disasters and 
concludes that regardless of an individual’s cultural background, some experiences 
can be traumatic, and PTSD and its symptoms are manifested universally; however, 
 51
 
the meanings of these experiences may differ from one culture to another and the full 
PTSD diagnostic criteria are infrequently met in international disaster studies. 
Similarly, Marsella, Friedman, Gerrity, and Scurfield (1996) report that PTSD is a 
common diagnosis among people of non-western countries such as Asian refuges, 
Latin American disaster survivors and immigrants. However, they also point out that 
due to cultural variations in emotional experiences, PTSD can be also seen as a 
culture-bound syndrome. Somatization, intrusive thoughts, dissociative experiences, 
avoidance/numbing and arousal symptoms, and the meaning attributed to these 
symptoms may vary as a function of an individual’s cultural background. Below are 
some sample of the international disaster studies and their findings.  
⋅ de la Fuente (1990) examined the psychological reactions of 
Mexican earthquake survivors and reported that 32% of the 
survivors manifested PTSD, 19% had generalized anxiety, and 
13% had depression.  
⋅ Lima, Pai, Santacruz, and Lozana (1991) reported that the majority 
of 102 volcanic eruption and mudslide survivors were diagnosed 
with PTSD and depression. 
⋅ Taylor (2000) examined 298 Tuvalu people after a fire in a 
dormitory at a secondary school and reported that “overall the 
Tuvalu people displayed a typical range of traumatic reaction to 
the tragedy.” 31% displayed intrusive, avoidance and arousal 
symptoms and met the PTSD criteria.  
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⋅ Odaira, Iwadate, and Raphael (1993) assessed 7,129 earthquake 
victims and found body swaying, trembling, anxiety, fear, 
irritability, and depression to be the most common reactions. 
⋅ -McFarlane and Hua (1993) examined 1,258 earthquake victims. 
Anxiety, depression and PTSD symptoms were found to be the 
most common symptoms. 50% of the cases met the PTSD 
diagnostic criteria. 
Therefore, findings from investigations of the symptom structures in different 
trauma populations have been inconsistent and have not been concordant with the 
symptom clusters specified in DSM-IV as discussed earlier. Questions mostly 
concern methodological issues and/or difficulties, such as differences in traumatizing 
events and traumatized populations, and the timing of the measurement. Also, the 
culture and/or social environment make a significant impact on people’s reactions to 
trauma. Above all, natural disasters affect whole families and community along with 
individuals. The psychological atmosphere in a society is a crucial factor that 
determines people’s interpretations and it clearly facilitates or hinders the 
manifestations of symptoms and the process of coping with stressful life events 
(Kleber, Figley, & Gersons, 1995). Finally, whether DSM’s definition and criterions 
reflect the cultural upbringings is imprecise so far. 
 
2.5 SUMMARY 
Two main goals are formulized based on the current literature summarized 
above.  
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The first goal of the study is to examine the diagnostic features of PTSD with 
consideration of several factors that contribute to the development of PTSD, such as 
the survivor’s gender, age, severity of loss, and personal and personality type 
characteristics. In other words, the present study aims to contribute to the debate 
about identifying the factor structures of posttraumatic stress disorder clusters in a 
sample of survivors from the 1999 Turkey earthquake, as well as to provide 
discussion in terms of the fitness of PTSD clusters to another culture, with the 
Turkish culture being the example. This is the interest of the present study because 
very little is known about the cultural appearances of trauma despite the fact that the 
impact of cultural values, belief systems, and rituals are so important not only in what 
kind of symptoms might be manifested, but also in how these symptoms are 
manifested after natural disasters.  
The second goal of the study is to examine some cognitive and emotional 
experiences that are central features of the development of PTSD: rumination, 
emotion regulation, and meta-mood experiences. These variables and their cultural 
appearances are crucial because they explain not only the onset of posttraumatic 
reactions but also they are maintaining factors as they were derived from theoretical 
considerations.   
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CHAPTER III 
Methodology 
3.1 GOALS OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
The main goal of the present study is to examine the traumatic reactions of 
Turkish earthquake survivors in a culture specific context. This main goal has two 
major parts: a) examination of the diagnostic features of PTSD in order to test the fit 
of DSM-IV-specified symptom clusters to Turkish earthquake survivors and b) 
examination of the strength of associations between level of exposure, rumination, 
age, gender, type of emotion regulation, and meta-mood traits, and PTSD.  
3.2 EXAMINATION OF THE DIAGNOSTIC FEATURES OF DSM-IV PTSD MODEL 
In this part, the symptom structures of PTSD were examined to test the fit of 
DSM-IV’s model to a Turkish sample. This was one of the main interests of the study 
for two reasons. First, the previous research reported inconsistent results about the fit 
of DSM-IV’s PTSD symptom clusters to different populations exposed to different 
traumatic events. Second, even though DSM-IV is widely used nationally and 
internationally, its fitness to different cultures has been examined. In order to examine 
the symptom structures of PTSD for a Turkish population, confirmatory and 
exploratory factor analysis were conducted using 440 earthquake survivors’ responses 
to The Reaction Index Scale (RIS).  The RIS was developed to measure posttraumatic 
stress reactions. Thus, the research question for this part was: 
Do Turkish earthquake survivors manifest a different pattern of PTSD 
symptom structures than is predicted by DSM-IV?  
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3.3 EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK/RESILIENCE 
VARIABLES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PTSD  
The second major goal was to examine cognitive (ruminations) and emotional 
experiences that were thought to maintain PTSD along with risk factors such as age, 
gender, and the magnitude of distress due to the traumatic event. Hence, the variables 
examined were the level of exposure to the earthquake, personal variables such as 
age and gender, and personality variables such as rumination, emotion regulation, 
and meta-mood traits. The associations of these variables with PTSD were examined 
individually using hierarchical multiple regression models. More specifically, this 
study examined the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Personal Factors  
As discussed in the literature review section, age and gender were reported in 
prior investigations to be related to PTSD and other psychological reactions to 
trauma. Therefore, it is hypothesized that age and gender will be associated with 
PTSD. More specifically, 
1a) Age will be negatively related to levels of PTSD even after controlling for 
the effects of economic and education levels, and number of children. 
1b) Women are more likely to report higher levels of PTSD even after 
controlling for the effects of economic and education levels and number of children. 
Hypothesis 2: Level of Exposure 
Exposure to a traumatic event is one of the diagnostic criteria for PTSD and it 
has been widely reported by previous studies that personal and material losses are 
closely related to PTSD. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the level of exposure to the 
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earthquake will be related to PTSD even after controlling for the effects of economic 
and education level, gender, and number of children.  
More specifically, levels of exposure as measured by The Distress From The 
Earthquake Scale will be positively related to levels of PTSD as measured by The 
Reaction Index Scale. 
Hypothesis 3: Personality Type Factors 
It is hypothesized that some cognitive and emotional characteristics of 
earthquake survivors will be associated with PTSD even after controlling for the 
effects of economic and education levels, gender and number of children. More 
specifically,  
 
3a) Rumination: The relationship between rumination and depression and 
other anxiety disorders has been established and ruminators are found to be 
more prone to psychological disturbances due to poor problem solving skills, 
a pessimistic outlook and poor interpersonal relationships. Rumination is also 
discussed to be an important aspect of intrusive thoughts by previous studies. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that levels of rumination as measured by The 
Rumination Scale will be positively related to levels of PTSD as measured by 
The Reaction Index Scale even after controlling for the effects of education 
and economic level, gender, and number of children. 
 
3b) Emotion Regulation: The paradoxical aspects of expressiveness have 
been shown by previous studies. People who express their emotions in a 
specific context with an appropriate level of intensity are more likely to cope 
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better with stressful experiences. The existing literature reports more than one 
type of emotion regulation. Suppression as an emotion regulation style was 
reported to be closely related to psychological disturbances because it 
exacerbates intrusive thoughts as it increases the likelihood of rebounding 
effects. Conversely, reappraisal was described as a more adaptive way of 
emotion regulation because in this case people evaluate their emotions in a 
specific context before his/her emotions spill over. Therefore, types of 
emotion regulation (suppression and reappraisal) as measured by The Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire will be related to PTSD as measured by The 
Reaction Index Scale.  More specifically,  
 
3b1. Suppression: It is proposed that suppression will be associated 
with PTSD even after controlling for the effects of education and 
economic level, gender, and number of children.  
 
3b2. Reappraisal: It is hypothesized that appraisal will be negatively 
associated with PTSD even after controlling for the effects of 
education and economic level, gender, and number of children.  
 
3c) Meta-Mood Traits: Meta-mood traits (clarity in discriminating feelings, 
attention to emotional experiences, and mood repairs) are important factors to 
decrease the intensity of negative emotions and rumination, and mitigate 
against the negative impacts of stressful situations. Therefore, for this study, it 
is hypothesized that meta-mood traits as measured by The Trait Meta-Mood 
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Scale will be negatively associated with PTSD as measured by The Reaction 
Index Scale even after controlling for the effects of education and economic 
level, gender, and number of children. More specifically,  
 
3c1. Clarity in discriminating feelings: Clarity on emotional 
experiences will be negatively related to levels of PTSD even after 
controlling for the effects of education and economic level, gender, 
and number of children. 
 
3c2. Attention to emotional experiences: Attention to emotional 
experiences will be negatively related to levels of PTSD even after 
controlling for the effects of education and economic level, gender, 
and number of children. 
 
3c3. Mood repair: Mood repair efforts will be negatively related to 
levels of PTSD even after controlling for the effects of education and 
economic level, gender, and number of children.  
  
3.4 EVENT 
Istanbul Earthquake (1999): A devastating event occurred in Turkey on 
August 17, 1999, when an earthquake registering 7.4 on the Richter scale hit the 
northwest part of Turkey, centering on Istanbul, Golcuk, Izmit, Adapazari, Yalova, 
and Kocaeli.  This area is the industrial heart of Turkey and historically the most 
attractive area for domestic immigrants, and is therefore the most populated area. The 
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worst part of this devastating earthquake was that it hit at 3:01 a.m. when the victims 
were at home sleeping. As apartment buildings collapsed, people were buried alive. 
On November 13, another earthquake hit the same area, registering 5.8 in magnitude. 
This earthquake caused already damaged buildings to collapse and injure people.  
This time, many of the deaths were due to heart attacks, and many people jumped in 
panic from their windows and balconies. Official estimates of the death toll are in 
excess of 17,000, while 1.5 million people were made homeless. The earthquake was 
classified as one of the world’s six deadliest earthquakes of the century (Newsweek, 
1999) and the biggest disaster in the history of the Turkish Republic.  
3.5 PROCEDURE AND PARTICIPANTS 
3.5.1 Participants and Procedures for Sample 1 
Shortly after the earthquake in Turkey, many international rescue teams came 
to Turkey from all over the world.  One of the groups from the U.S.A arrived six 
weeks after the earthquake to implement their outreach program under the leadership 
of Dr. Kalayjian.  The program was called the Mental Health Outreach Program 
(MHOP) and was developed based on Alfaro’s work (1986). This group stayed in the 
area for two weeks and delivered the six-step intervention program with the 
cooperation of other psychologists from Turkey, Israel and Germany. This 
empowerment program reached over 600 people between the ages of 5 and 60. The 
steps of the program were 1) Assessment, 2) Expression of Feelings, 3) Empathy and 
Validation, 4) Discovery and Expression of Positive Meanings, 4) Information 
Dissemination, and 6) Diaphragmatic Breathing Exercises.   
For the first step of the program, the level of post-traumatic stress was 
measured using the Reaction Index Scale (RIS) (Frederick, 1986).  Dr. Kalayjian had 
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used the RIS with outreach programs for survivors of previous natural disasters, and 
this scale was originally chosen for its clarity and brevity.   
The data collected in Turkey include approximately 440 survivors of the 1999 
earthquake.  These survivors lived in Izmit, Golcuk, or Istanbul, attended the MHOP 
program and completed the Reaction Index Scale and demographic questionnaire. 
The age of the participants ranged from 11 to 59 years (M=19.63, SD=13.25), with 
196 of the participants being older than 16; the ages of forty-two people were 
missing.  Also, 267 participants were women, 155 participants were men, and the 
gender of 18 participants was unknown.  
3.5.2 Participants and Procedures for Sample 2: 
Additional data were gathered from Turkey by self-administered 
questionnaires at the end of the 2001. The inclusion criteria was being an adult and 
living in the earthquake area at the time of the earthquake. In order to reach these 
participants, people who were involved and helped survivors such as psychologists, 
teachers, and local authorities were contacted to ask for help in finding the potential 
participants. Also, after the 1999 earthquake, several centers were opened to provide 
psychological help and consultation for earthquake survivors. These centers were 
located in or in close proximity to earthquake areas and they were run by mostly 
volunteer psychologists and psychiatrists and supported by the Turkish Psychological 
Association. These centers were contacted and they provided help in reaching 
potential participants and volunteered to be referrals if a referral was requested by the 
participants. By using these resources and personal contacts, potential participants 
were contacted by mail or phone.  
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After contacting the prospective participants via mail or phone, the aim of the 
study was explained to them. They were informed that their participation was 
completely voluntary and confidential, and they could withdraw from the study at any 
time. Once they agreed to participate, they were asked to complete the set of 
questionnaires. Approximately 210 questionnaires were distributed and 157 of them 
were returned. Therefore, the return rate was about 74.7 %.  
Of the participants, 84 (53.5%) were women and 73 (46.5) were men. Eighty 
five (54.1%) participants were married, 65 (41.4%) were single, five (3.2%) were 
divorced, and two participants did not indicate their marital status. The number of 
children in the family ranged from 1 to 6. Most of the participants (50.3%) had no 
children. 15.3 % had only one child, 22.9 % had two children, and 8.4 % had three or 
more children. Finally, three participants did not indicate their number of children. 
Regarding education level, 8 (5.1%) participants reported holding a Ph.D degree, 10 
(6.4%) participants had a M.A/M.Sc. degree, 61 (38.9%) participants had a B.A/B.Sc. 
degree, 36 (22.9%) participants had a high school degree, and finally 42 (26.7%) 
participants had a middle school degree.  Of the participants, 39 (24.8%) classified 
their economic level as “good,” 78 (49.7) as “middle,” 24 (15.3%) as “lower middle” 
and 13 (8.3) as “bad.” Three participants did not indicate their economic level.  
These participants were also asked whether they received any psychological 
and/or material help after the earthquake. All of the participants reported that they 
received financial/material help from the government or other aid organizations. Two 
participants reported that they had attended one debriefing session but found it “not 
very helpful.” These two participants wrote “they [experts leading the debriefing] 
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encouraged us to talk about our experiences during or after the earthquake. We have 
already been talking about the earthquake among each other anyway.” 
3.6 MEASURES 
3.6.1 Procedure for Translation of Measures 
With the exception of the Reaction Index Scale (RIS) and SCL-R inventory 
which were translated into Turkish as part of the previous research - each of the 
questionnaires used in this research needed to be translated into Turkish.  These 
questionnaires were independently translated first into Turkish by 3 people who are 
graduate students in counseling or clinical psychology. The questionnaires were then 
exchanged and translated back into English. In other words, the translators did not 
translate their own Turkish translations back into English. Minor discrepancies 
between translations, such as specific idioms were resolved by discussion until an 
agreement was reached. These few idioms were replaced by regular statements that 
give the same/similar meanings. There was no disagreement at the end of the 
discussion. Later, ten people were asked to fill out the final version of questionnaires 
to check the clearness of each item.  Each of the measures is described in the 
following paragraphs. 
3.6.2 The Reaction Index Scale   
PTSD symptomology was measured by The Reaction Index Scale (RIS). This 
scale (Frederick, 1986) includes 28 items. It has two distinct sections. The first 
section includes items 1-20 and is the symptoms section.  The second section includes 
items 21-28 and is used to measure the onset and duration of the symptoms and the 
help seeking behavior related to the event; this second part does not contribute to the 
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total symptom scores. The symptom scale is a 5-point Likert-type scale (none of the 
time = 0; most of the time = 4) and the greatest possible total score is 80. Frederick 
considers raw scores of 25-39 to indicate moderate PTSD, 40-59 severe PTSD, and 
60 or higher very severe PTSD (Haris & Riad, 1997). Frederick (1987) reported a 
test-retest alpha coefficient of .77 and high levels of agreement between 
determinations of caseness based on the RIS and the MMPI-PTSD scale.  Haris & 
Riad (1997) reported that the RIS measures PTSD among victims of civilian trauma 
and has been used internationally in such places as Armenia, Italy, Mexico, Egypt, 
Norway, Uganda, Australia, The Dominican Republic, and Thailand; however, no 
reported reliability or validity information for these international samples was found. 
Our sample responded to 20 items by using a 7-point scale (1=strongly disagree; 
7=strongly agree) and the reliability coefficient was found to be .88.   
3.6.3 The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire  
This questionnaire developed by Gross and John (2000) measures individual 
differences in emotion regulation with a 7-point Likert-type scale (1=strongly 
disagree; 7=strongly agree).  It reports two types of emotion regulation scores.  The 
first score is for expressive suppression, which is used “to rate the extent to which 
[participants] typically try to inhibit their emotion-expressive behavior (p.15).”  The 
expressive suppression is a four item subscale and includes items such as “I keep my 
emotions to myself” and “I control my emotions by not expressing them.” The second 
score is for appraisal, which is used “to rate the extent to which [participants] 
typically try to think about situations differently in order to change how they feel.”  
The appraisal is a 6 item subscale and includes items such as  “When I’m faced with a 
stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way that helps me stay calm” and 
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“I control my emotions by changing the way I think.” The reliability alphas were 
reported as .77 for expressive suppression and .75 for reappraisal. For our sample, 
reliability coefficients ranged from .52 to .47 for the total and subscale scores. 
3.6.4 Trait Meta-mood Scale (TMMS) 
This scale developed by Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, and Palfai (1995) 
was used to measure survivors’ beliefs about their feelings. This measure aims to 
assess relatively stable individual differences in people’s tendency to attend to their 
moods and emotions, discriminate clearly among them, and regulate them. Therefore, 
it has three subscales: Attention to Feelings, Clarity in Discriminating Feelings, and 
Mood Repair. Salovey and his colleagues examined its factor structure, convergent 
and discriminant validity and reported that TMMS is a reliable and valid measure for 
researchers interested in emotional disclosure and clarity subscale is an especially 
strong predictor of the unpleasant quality of ruminations after stressful experiences. 
This measure was chosen over other available measures because it is defined as 
particularly appropriate for studies interested in PTSD (Ansorge, Litz, & Orsillo, 
1996). The scale has a total of 30 items. For the Turkish sample, a 7-point scale 
(1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree) was used and the reliability alphas were 
found as .77 for the total score, .72 for The Attention Sub-scale, .59 for Repair Sub-
scale, and .66 for the Clarity Sub-scale. 
3.6.5 Rumination Scale  
Rumination is measured using part of a larger questionnaire called “Responses 
to Depression Questionnaire,” which is a 71-item, 5-point Likert type scale. This 
scale was constructed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) and has four distinct 
sections: the Ruminative Responses Scale, Distracting Responses Scale, Problem-
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Solving Scale, and Dangerous Activities Scale. For this study, only 21 slightly 
modified versions of the Ruminative Responses Items were used (Ansorge, 1996). A 
sample item reads “Think about how alone you feel.” For this scale, Cronbach’s alpha 
of .89 was reported (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991).  For this study a 7-point 
Likert type scale  (1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree) was used and inter-item 
reliability was found as .90.  
3.6.6 Level of Exposure 
Level of exposure was measured using six questions that were developed as 
part of this research based on four questions that Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow’s 
developed (1999).  These questions are as follows: 1. How much damage did the 
earthquake cause to the area where you were when the earthquake happened? 2. How 
much damage did the earthquake cause to your house? 3. How much stress did you 
experience by losing family members and/or close friends during the earthquake? 4. 
How much stress did you experience because your family members and/or close 
friends were injured by the earthquake? 5. How much stress did you experience 
because you were injured by the earthquake? 6. How much of your daily life has been 
inconvenienced as a result of earthquake? Participants responded to these questions 
using a 4-point Likert-type scale (1=none; 4=a great deal). The overall level of 
exposure score was calculated by combining these six ratings. The inter-item 
reliability coefficient for our sample was .71.  
3.6.7 Psychological Distress 
Psychological Distress was measured by the Turkish version of the SCL-R 
inventory. The original inventory consists of 90, 5-point Likert-type items. Uner 
(1991) examined the psychometric properties of the scale for Turkish people and 
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created a 40 item scale which clusters into four factors: Somatization, Depression, 
Phobic Anxiety, and Hostility/Irritability. Unver (1991) reported the .92 Cronbach 
alpha for the total scale. The Cronbach alphas for each factors varied from .72 to .85. 
This inventory was chosen because it is widely used in the U.S as well as in Turkey, 
and its sex and age norms have been reported. For our sample, the reliability 
coefficient of .95 was found for the total distress score. The reliability alphas for the 
subscales were .89 (Somatization), .89 (depression), .88 (Anxiety) and .81 
(Hostility/Irritability). 
Finally, demographic information was requested regarding participants’ age, 
gender, economic and educational level, marital status, and number of children in the 
household. In addition, participants were specifically asked whether they received any 
psychological treatments and/or financial/material help after the earthquake. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Results 
4.1 OVERVIEW OF ANALYSES 
This study was designed to explore the applicability of DSM-IV’s 
formulization of PTSD to Turkish earthquake survivors and to explore the impact of 
several variables on the development of PTSD. In this sense, this study includes two 
parts. 
In the first part, exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were performed 
on existing data collected after the 1999 Istanbul earthquake to test DSM-IV’s PTSD 
model. The data used in this part consisted of 440 Turkish earthquake survivors’ 
responses to The Reaction Index Scale developed by Frederick (1986). Frederick 
stated that this scale was developed based on DSM’s three symptom clusters, which 
attempt to capture the universal human responses to trauma (personal conversation 
with Frederick, 2000).  
In the second part, additional data were gathered from Turkey during February 
2002 to examine the relationship between emotion regulation, meta-mood traits, 
rumination, age, gender, educational level and level of exposure, and posttraumatic 
stress reactions of Turkish people. These data include 157 earthquake survivors’ 
responses to several questionnaire measures of PTSD, rumination, emotion 
regulation, meta-mood traits, and general distress.       
The results of this second part are presented in two major sections. The first 
section focuses on the descriptive aspects of the sample and the results presented 
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include the means, standard deviations, and/or frequency distributions of age, income, 
education, number of children, economic level and so on. The second section contains 
the results from multiple regression analyses examining the correlations among 
several variables.   
4.2 EXAMINATION OF SYMPTOM STRUCTURE OF PTSD: APPLICABILITY OF 
DSM-IV’S FORMULIZATION 
4.2.1 Descriptive Analyses of 1999 Data 
The data collected in Turkey consist of a sample of approximately 440 
survivors of the 1999 earthquake.  These survivors lived in Izmit, Golcuk, or Istanbul, 
attended the MHOP program and completed the Reaction Index Scale and 
demographic questionnaire. The age of the participants ranged from 11 to 59 years 
(M=19.63, SD=13.25), with 55.6% of the sample being 15 years or older. The ages of 
forty-two people were missing.  Also, 267 participants were women, 155 participants 
were men, and the genders of 18 participants were unknown.  
4.2.2 Factor Analysis Results 
Participants 
Eighty cases were excluded due to data missing in one or more of the scale 
items or the presence of multivariate outliers, leaving 360 cases in the factor analysis. 
The final data included 225 women, 124 men and 11 participants who did not indicate 
their gender with a mean age of 21.8 years (range 10 to 59).   
Data Screening and Missing Data 
A total of 69 cases were deleted due to missing data in scale items. An 
additional 11 cases were identified as multivariate outliers and deleted. Examination 
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of the scale items revealed substantial problems with skew and kurtosis for several of 
the scale items. Transformations were considered; however, each item consists of a 
five-point scale, and the limited range of scores makes transformation of data 
ineffective. To deal with the nonnormality, the Satorra-Bentler Scaled χ2 statistic 
(Satorra & Benter, 1988) was used. This statistic accounts for nonnormality, reducing 
the problems resulting from the skew and kurtosis exhibited by these data because it 
is more robust to violations of non-normality.  
Since nearly 16% of the cases in the original data set proved unusable due to 
missing data, questions arose as to why these data were incomplete. To address this 
issue, the cases with missing data were compared to those cases without missing data. 
A comparison of the average scores on the Reaction Index Scale using all scale items 
with responses indicated that those individuals with missing data (M = 2.92) scored 
similarly to the individuals without missing data (M = 2.88), t(434) < 1,  p = .54, η2 = 
.00. The age and gender of the individuals with missing data (M=22.9 years, 63% 
women) were also similar to those individuals without missing data (M=21.6 years, 
64% women), t (396) < 1, p = .46, η2 = .00, Х2 (1) = .04, p = .85, respectively. These 
results suggest that those individuals who did not answer all of the scale items did not 
differ significantly from those individuals who completed all measures. 
Model Testing 
Multiple models were tested using confirmatory factor analysis to determine 
which model fit the data the best.  For the purposes of these analyses, an adequate 
model fit was defined as having a ratio of X2 to degrees of freedom of no more than 
approximately 2 to 1, a root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) below 
.10, and a Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Robust Comparative Fit Index of .90 or 
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higher (Tabachnick & Fidel, 1996). Superseding statistical criteria is parsimony. 
Good model fit requires that models be simple and easy to interpret. 
DSM-IV Model 
The first model, represented in Figure 1, tested a DSM-IV derived factor 
structure. This analysis tested the fit of 16 of the variables onto three factors, 
Avoidance/Numbing, Reexeperiencing, and Arousal. Table 1 presents the fit indexes 
for several DSM-IV based models. The initial orthogonal model fit the data poorly 
but did indicate an improvement over the independence model. The second model 
tests an oblique solution, adding covariance paths between the three factors. While 
the oblique model significantly improved the model fit, it did not produce a good 
model fit overall. Since neither model fit the data well, the Langrange Multiplier test 
for adding parameters was used to improve the model fit. Based on this test, several 
additional paths were added and two paths were deleted to create a model that fit the 
data reasonably well. The final model, represented in Figure 2, adequately fit the data 
but failed to establish parsimony. Given the number of path additions needed to 
establish model fit, it was concluded that the DSM-based model does not fit these 
data.  
Establishing a Model of Best Fit 
Given the inadequacy of the DSM-IV factors, an appropriate factor structure 
for these data was investigated. Performing a principal components analysis with 
varimax rotation on these data resulted in three factors being extracted based on their 
eigenvalues. These three factors explained 57% of the variance in the scale variables. 
Table 2 shows factor loadings. These three factors were tentatively labeled 
Reexperiencing/Arousal, Cognitive Impairment, and Numbing. Based on the factor 
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structure suggested by this exploratory analysis, confirmatory factor analysis was 
utilized to establish the model fit and improve the model. Figure 3 represents the first 
model. As shown in Table 1, this model did not provide a good fit to the data. 
However, this model outperformed the initial DSM based model. The second model 
tested was an oblique model that allowed the three factors to correlate. This model fit 
the data adequately and is simple, parsimonious, and easy to interpret. 
Comparing Older and Younger Participants 
A multi-sample covariance analysis fitting the derived factor structure to both 
older (n = 167; over 15 years old) and younger (n = 167; 15 years or less) participants 
indicated that only three of the 21 paths differed significantly between the groups. 
Similar and correlated three factor structures emerged for the two groups. A Lagrange 
multiplier was used to decide which three factor structures were significant at the 
<.05 level. This analysis compared the fit of the factor structure between the groups, 
yielding a test of whether the factor structure is applicable to both older and younger 
participants. This analysis indicated that the factor structure fit both the adult and 
children data adequately, χ2 (279) = 549.4, χ2: df = 1.97, CFI = .901, RSMEA = .054. 
Therefore, based on these results, it was decided that the three factor structures for the 
adults and children are similar and that the collapsed analyses above are appropriate. 
4.3 EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK/RESILIENCE 
VARIABLES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PTSD USING MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
ANALYSIS  
4.3.1 Ratio of Cases to Predictors 
Before utilizing multiple regression models, the ratio of cases to predictors 
was defined. Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) suggested that  “the simplest rule of 
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thumb are N>50+8m (m is the number of predictors) for testing the multiple 
correlation and N>104+m for testing individual predictors.  These rules of thumb 
assume a medium-size relationship between the independent and the dependent 
variables, α = .05 and β = .20” (p. 132). Based on an examination of the correlation 
coefficients, it was decided that 11 predictors would be included in the multiple 
regression analyses for this study.  Therefore, the required sample size was defined as 
138 for testing multiple regression models and 116 for testing individual predictors. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) suggested the use of one or both of these rule of thumbs 
for defining the required sample size. Since the initial sample size was 157, it was 
concluded that the sample size was large enough to run the multiple regression 
analyses.  
4.3.2 Assumptions Testing 
All dependent and independent variables were tested for assumptions of 
normality, linearity, multicollinearity, and outliers. For the normality assumption, 
descriptive analyses were conducted and skewness and kurtosis values were 
examined. Morgan and Griego (1998) suggested a rule of thumb for testing 
normality: normality is violated if the skewness and/or kurtosis measure is more than 
2.5 times its standard error. Based on this rule of thumb, the age variable was found 
to be skewed. The age variable was also not correlated with the criterion variable and 
thus it was not included in the analyses. Later, histograms for the skewed variable as 
well as for all the other variables were checked to evaluate the severity of violations 
as well.   
For the linearity assumption, scatterplots and correlation coefficients were 
examined. No nonlinear relationships between the criterion variable and the 
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predictors were observed. Correlation coefficients for the criterion variables and all 
predictor variables were examined for multicollinearity as well as linearity. 
Multicollinearity was also checked and no serious problems were observed. 
Correlation coefficients among all variables are presented in the Table 3, 4, and 5.  
 Finally, screening for outliers was performed through a residual analysis after 
an initial regression run. Based on SPSS’s casewise diagnostics (“outliers outside 3 
standard deviations”) analysis, case 53 was found to be an outlier and was deleted to 
prevent its impact on the regression solutions. 
4.3.3 Intercorrelations Among Predictors 
Mostly mild to moderate correlation coefficients were found among predictors 
of the study (see Table 3). Ideally, there should be no correlations among the 
predictor variables because regression solutions are extremely sensitive to the 
combination of included variables, but this is hardly the case (Tabachnick & Fidel, 
1996). Therefore, the tolerance values generated by the regression collinearity 
statistics were given special attention to determine the strength of the relationship 
between the predictor values. When tolerance values were less than .01, variables 
were considered multicollinear (Brace, Kemp, & Snelgar, 2000). The results 
suggested that there were no severe violations of multicollinearity assumptions. As 
expected, medium to strong correlation coefficients were found between total scale 
scores (meta-mood traits and emotion regulation) and their subscale scores. Table 3 
shows all intercorrelations among predictor variables and the means and standard 
deviations for each variable.  
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4.4 INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN PTSD AND GENERAL DISTRESS VARIABLES 
A criterion variable for the study was The Reaction Index Scale (RIS). The 
RIS was used as a measure of PTSD and was the main interest and thus was the 
criterion variable of the study. General distress level (SCL-R) was also measured to 
find out whether any overlaps exist between the measures of RIS and SCL-R and its 
subscales (Depression, Somatic Reactions, Anxiety, and Hostility). As shown in 
Table 4, RIS and SCL-R were significantly correlated (r(149)=.69, p<.0001). Their 
subscale scores were also moderately to robustly correlated with coefficients ranging 
from  .36 to 70. These levels of correlations suggested that while there was some 
overlap in these two scales, they also appeared to represent separate and unique 
constructs. For this study, only the total score of the RIS was used as the criterion 
variable. 
4.5 INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE CRITERION AND THE PREDICTOR 
VARIABLES 
Another correlation matrix was created to examine the relationship among 
demographic, predictor, criterion variables and general distress level, and the 
correlation coefficients are presented in Table 5. No curvilinear relationship was 
observed between the criterion variable and the predictor variables.   
The RIS was significantly correlated with the number of children (r(148)= 
.195, p<.017), education level (r(152)= -.39, p<.0001), economic level  (r(148)=.24, 
p<,004), and gender (r(152)= -.17, p<.040). 
The RIS was also found to be correlated with level of exposure (r(148)=.52, 
p<.0001), rumination (r(148)=.56, p<.0001), repair (r(146)= -.29, p<.0001), clarity 
(r(144)= -.34, p<.0001), and suppression (r(149)=.29, p<.0001). 
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Based on the literature review, age was initially planned to be included as a 
predictor variable; however, no significant correlation coefficients were found 
between age and the RIS, and thus the age variable was excluded from the multiple 
regression analyses because it was not expected to add anything to the prediction of 
PTSD. Also, the correlation coefficient between the attention scores and PTSD was 
not significant, and it was excluded from the regression models as well.  The total 
number of predictors was 11: gender, number of children, education level, economic 
level, level of exposure, rumination, repair, clarity, emotion regulation, suppression, 
and meta-mood traits. Of these predictors, number of children, education and 
economic level were introduced in hierarchical analyses as the control variables.  
4.6 MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSES 
In the following section, the findings of the hierarchical multiple regression 
analyses are presented. A separate hierarchical multiple regression analysis was run 
for each predictor. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis allows researchers to 
determine the sequence of predictors based on logic or a theory. For this study, it was 
predicted that individual predictors would have greater theoretical importance than 
the demographic variables found to be correlated with the criterion variables. It is 
possible to enter all of the predictors in one analysis if the order of entry of predictors 
can be justified based on theory. However, since a particular entry order for the 
predictors could not be justified, as this was an exploratory analysis, a separate 
hierarchical analysis was run for each predictor.     
4.6.1 Hypothesis 1: Personal Factors  
It was hypothesized that age and gender will be associated with PTSD. More 
specifically, 
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1a) The age of the participants will be related to levels of PTSD even after 
controlling for the effects of demographic variables (gender, education, economic 
level, and number of children).  
1b) Women are more likely to report higher levels of PTSD even after 
controlling for the effects of demographic variables (age, education level, economical 
level, and number of children).  
Findings for Hypothesis 1a-Age 
Based on a preliminary analysis, age was found to be uncorrelated with the 
level of PTSD and thus regression analysis was not utilized for this hypothesis.  
Findings for Hypothesis 1b-Gender  
The control variables (number of children, education level, and economic 
level) were entered in step 1; the R squared was significant and accounted for 16 % of 
the variance in PTSD (R-Squared =.160, F (3, 144)=9.11, p=.0001.   Education level 
made a significant contribution to the variance accounted for in PTSD (β =-.35, p = 
.0001), indicating that participants who reported having higher education levels also 
reported having lower levels of PTSD.  
After controlling for the effects of the demographic variables in Step 1, the 
variable of gender was included in Step 2; the change in R-squared for Step 2 was not 
significant (R Squared Change=.016, F (1, 143)=2.86, p=.093). However, a trend was 
observed for the effect of gender on PTSD, indicating that women are more likely to 
report higher levels of PTSD.  
The overall regression model predicting the development of PTSD using 
gender along with the number of children, and education and economic levels 
explained a significant amount of variability in PTSD (Adj. R2 = .153, F (4,143) = 
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7.6, p = .0001). The full model accounted for 15 % of the variance in PTSD. These 
findings are summarized in Table 6. 
4.6.2 Hypothesis 2: Level of Exposure: 
It is hypothesized that the level of exposure to the earthquake will be 
associated with PTSD even after controlling for the effects of age, gender, economic 
and education level, and number of children. More specifically, the greater the level 
of exposure as measured using The Distress From The Earthquake scale will be 
related to higher levels of PTSD as measured by The Reaction Index Scale. 
Findings for Hypothesis 2-Level of Exposure 
The control variables consisting of number of children, gender, education 
level, and economic level were entered in step 1; the R squared was significant and 
accounted for 17% of the variance in PTSD (R Squared =.174, F (4, 141)=7.409, 
p=0001).  Education level made a significant contribution to the variance accounted 
for in PTSD (β =-.32, p = .0001), indicating that participants who reported having 
higher education levels also reported having lower levels of PTSD.  
After controlling for the effects of the demographic variables in Step 1, level 
of exposure was included in Step 2; the change in R-squared for Step 2 was 
significant and accounted for 16.8% of the variance in PTSD (R-Squared 
Change=.168, F (1, 141)=35.68, p=.0001). 
The overall regression model predicting the development of PTSD from the 
levels of exposure along with the number of children, gender, education and 
economic levels explained a significant amount of variability in PTSD (Adj. R2 = 
.318, F (5,140) = 14.521, p = .0001). The full model accounted for 32% of the 
variance in PTSD. These findings are summarized in Table 7. 
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4.6.3 Hypothesis 3: Personality Type Factors 
It is hypothesized that some cognitive and emotional characteristics of 
earthquake survivors will be associated with PTSD even after controlling for the 
effects of age, gender, economic and education level, marital status, and number of 
children. More specifically,  
3a) Rumination  
Levels of rumination as measured by The Rumination Scale will be related to 
PTSD as measured by The Reaction Index Scale even after controlling for the effects 
of gender, education and economic level, and number of children. 
 
Findings for Hypothesis 3a Rumination 
The control variables number of children, education level, and economic level 
were entered in step 1; the R-squared was significant and accounted for 16% of the 
variance in PTSD (R-Squared =.172, F (4, 140)=7.296, p=0001).  Education level 
made a significant contribution to the variance accounted for in PTSD (β =-.324, p = 
.0001), indicating that participants who reported having higher education levels also 
reported having lower levels of PTSD.  
After controlling for the effects of the demographic variables in Step 1, 
rumination was included in Step 2; the change in R-squared for Step 2 was significant 
and accounted for 21% of the variance in PTSD (R-Squared Change=.212, F (1, 
149)=47.9.0, p=.0001). 
The overall regression model predicting the development of PTSD from 
rumination along with number of children, gender, education and economic levels 
explained a significant amount of variability in PTSD (Adj. R2 = .362, F (5,139) = 
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17.37, p = .0001). The full model accounted for 36 % of the variance in PTSD. These 
findings are summarized in Table 8. 
3b) Emotion Regulation 
3b1. Reappraisal  
It is hypothesized that appraisal will be associated with PTSD even after 
controlling for education and economic level, gender, and number of children.  
3b2. Suppression  
It is proposed that suppression will be negatively associated with PTSD even 
after controlling for education and economic level, gender, and number of children. 
 
Findings for Hypothesis 3b1. Reappraisal and Suppression 
Reappraisal was not correlated with the criterion variables and thus it was not 
included in the regression analysis. 
Suppression: The control variables number of children, gender, education 
level, and economic level were entered in step 1; R-squared was significant and 
accounted for 17% of the variance in PTSD (R-Squared =.169, F (4, 141)=7.19, 
p=.0001).  Education level made a significant independent contribution to the 
variance accounted for in PTSD (β =-.320, p = .001), indicating that participants who 
reported having higher education levels also reported having lower levels of PTSD.  
After controlling for the effects of the demographic variables in Step 1, 
suppression was included in Step 2; the change in R-Squared for Step 2 was 
significant and accounted for 5% of the variance in PTSD (R-Squared Change=.045, 
F (1, 140)=8.026, p=.005).  
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The overall regression model predicting the development of PTSD from 
suppression along with number of children, gender, education and economic levels 
explained a significant amount of variability in PTSD (Adj. R2 = .186, F (5,140) = 
7.640, p = .0001). The full model accounted for 19 % of the variance in PTSD. These 
findings are summarized in Table 9. 
3c) Meta-Mood Traits 
3c1. Clarity in discriminating feelings 
3c1. Clarity in emotional experiences will be negatively related to levels of 
PTSD even after controlling for education and economic level, gender, and number of 
children. 
 
Findings for Hypothesis 3c1-Clarity in Discriminating Feelings:  
The control variables number of children, gender, education level, and 
economic level were entered in step 1; R-Squared was significant and accounted for 
18% of the variance in PTSD (R Squared =.183, F (4, 136)=7.6, p=.0001).  Education 
level made a significant contribution to the variance accounted for in PTSD (β = -
.317, p = .001), indicating that participants who reported having higher education 
levels also reported having lower levels of PTSD.  
After controlling for the effects of the demographic variables in Step 1, clarity 
was included in Step 2; the change in R-Squared for Step 2 was significant and 
accounted for 8% of the variance in PTSD (R Square Change=.079, F (1, 135)=14.42, 
p=.0001).   
The overall regression model predicting the development of PTSD from 
clarity along with the number of children, gender, education and economic levels 
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explained a significant amount of variability in PTSD (Adj. R2 = .234, F (5,135) = 
9.6, p = .0001). The full model accounted for 23 % of the variance in PTSD. These 
findings are summarized in Table 10. 
3c2. Attention to emotional experiences 
3c2. Attention to emotional experience will be negatively related to levels of 
PTSD even after controlling for education and economic level, gender, and number of 
children. 
 
Findings for Hypothesis 3c3: Attention was not correlated with the level of 
PTSD and thus it was not included in the regression analysis. 
 
3c3.Mood repair     
3c3. Mood repair efforts will be negatively related to levels of PTSD even 
after controlling for education and economic level, gender, and number of children. 
 
Findings for Hypothesis 3c3. Mood repair 
The control variables number of children, gender, education level, and 
economic level were entered in step 1; the R squared was significant and accounted 
for 18% of the variance in PTSD (R Squared =.182, F (4, 138)=7.68, p=.0001).  
Education level made a significant contribution to the variance accounted for in 
PTSD (β =-.317, p = .001), indicating that participants who reported having higher 
education levels also reported having lower levels of PTSD.  
After controlling for the effects of the demographic variables in Step 1, mood 
repair was included in Step 2; the change in R-Squared for Step 2 was significant and 
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accounted for 8% of the variance in PTSD (R-Squared Change=.078, F (1, 
137)=14.36, p=.0001). 
The overall regression model predicting the development of PTSD from mood 
repair along with the number of children, gender, education and economic levels 
explained a significant amount of variability in PTSD (Adj. R2 = .233, F (5,137) = 
9.61, p = .0001). The full model accounted for 23 % of the variance in PTSD. These 
findings are summarized in Table 11. 
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CHAPTER V 
Discussion 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this study was to examine the fit of DSM’s PTSD symptom 
structure to Turkish earthquake survivors and to examine the strength of association 
between several variables and the development of PTSD. In addition, the study aimed 
to look at these issues in a culture specific context, because most of the knowledge on 
trauma and emotional experiences has been produced based on western cultural 
premises and imported to other international cultures. The hope is to fill this gap by 
examining the appearances of several features of trauma and of emotional 
experiences in Turkish culture.  The study includes two distinct parts.  
In the first part, confirmatory and exploratory factor analyses were utilized to 
test the symptom structures of PTSD as defined by DSM-IV. This was one of the 
main interests because despite the widespread use of DSM as a primary diagnostic 
tool, its fitness to international populations in terms of the DSM-specified clustering 
of symptoms has not been examined. Even within western cultures, several previous 
studies have failed to confirm the symptom structure of PTSD for different traumatic 
events. These studies raised substantial concern regarding the use of DSM’s PTSD 
formulation, especially regarding its symptom structures. These previous studies have 
also used different methodologies to examine PTSD’s symptom structure. For 
example, most of the researchers have only used exploratory factor analysis, which is 
less helpful for model testing than confirmatory factor analysis, and the few studies 
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that have used confirmatory factor analysis have failed to confirm the three factor 
structures of PTSD.  Therefore, the study reported here used both confirmatory and 
exploratory factor analyses.  
In the second part, based on previous studies, several risk and/or resilience 
variables were combined to examine their strength of association to the development 
of PTSD. For this study, the variables were level of exposure, which was defined 
based on the distress caused by the earthquake, personal variables such as age and 
gender, and personality variables such as emotion regulation, rumination, and meta-
mood experiences.  
5.2 SYMPTOM STRUCTURES OF PTSD      
Confirmatory factor analysis failed to confirm the three factor structures 
(avoidance/numbing, reexperiencing, and arousal) reported by DSM-IV.  The results 
of the exploratory factor analysis suggested a different factor structure for the Turkish 
earthquake survivors: reexperiencing/arousal, cognitive impairment, and numbness.  
This study offers support to previous studies that reported poor fit of the DSM model 
to different traumatic experiences and populations (e.g., McMillen, North, & Smith, 
2000; Buckley, Blanchard, & Hickling, 1998; King, Leskin, King, & Weathers, 
1998). In an earlier study, Smith and North (1993) claimed that due to low rates of 
diagnosable PTSD syndromes, symptoms might cluster differently.  
This study revealed that reexperiencing and arousal are one cluster instead of 
two different clusters as proposed in the DSM conceptualization.  Although causality 
cannot be established based on this study, it may be speculated from this close 
relationship between reexperiencing and arousal that recurrent, intrusive, and 
distressing recollections of the traumatic events may trigger heightened emotional 
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arousal. Morgan (1997) reports that exaggerated startle response may be state 
dependent, and emotional arousal can be produced by reminders of traumatic 
experiences. Kennedy-More and Watson (2001) also discussed that avoidance is less 
likely to generate heightened cardiovascular arousal. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that reexperiencing and arousal symptoms were found to be associated. In essence, a 
person who reports a high level of reexperiencing symptoms is likely to report arousal 
symptoms as well.      
The results of this study also indicate that avoidance symptoms may not arise 
simultaneously with numbing symptoms as DSM suggests. The items indicating 
avoidance were not grouped together and numbing responses emerged as a separate 
symptom cluster. This result offers support for the previous studies that reported that 
avoidance and numbing responses should be seen as separate mechanisms. Foa, 
Zinbarg, and Rothbaum, (1992), for example, describe that unlike numbing, 
avoidance is a strategic effortful mechanism. Similarly, Anthony, Lonigan, and Hecht 
(1999) make a distinction between active avoidance (e.g., avoiding trauma related 
thoughts by engaging in distractive activities and social interactions) and passive 
avoidance (withdrawal from any activities).  
Interestingly, numbing emerged as a separate, unique factor for this study 
while most previous studies, especially international epidemiological studies, report 
that numbing responses are less likely to be reported in the case of natural disaster 
induced trauma. In one of these studies, Jenkins (1996) examined the cultural validity 
of the PTSD diagnostic categories using anthropological interviews with Salvadoran 
women refugees and reported that criterion C (numbing/avoidance) was not common. 
This author specified that a “feeling of detachment, estrangement, restricted affect, 
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foreshortened future, or inability or unwillingness to narrative the traumatic situation 
were not marked” whereas criterion A (reexperiencing) and criterion D (arousal) were 
clearly observed.  Basoglu, Salcioglu, Livanou, Ozveren, Aker, Kilic, and 
Mesticioglu (2001) attempted to develop a measure that reflects DSM-IV’s PTSD and 
depression criteria shortly after the 1999 earthquake in Turkey. Their study states 
some difficulty identifying avoidance and numbing types of symptoms as well. 
Although their Turkish sample clearly reported numbing symptoms, avoidance 
symptoms were not as common. Unlike Jenkins (1996), Basoglu et. al (2001) 
concluded that DSM-IV’s criteria are applicable to Turkish culture despite some 
possibility of confusion between PTSD and depressive symptoms. However, these 
two studies relied on relatively small sample sizes and they are not factor analytic 
studies as they aimed to look at the prevalence or frequency of symptoms of PTSD in 
the culture studied.  
The results of the present study suggest a new factor, cognitive impairment, 
which was not reported as a separate factor before. Cognitive impairments have been 
widely reported in the previous studies as a result of traumatic events in the form of 
difficulties in concentration and memory dysfunction (e.g., Wolfe & Charney, 1991) 
but it has never been considered as an independent symptom cluster. A study by 
Vasterling, Brailey, Constans, and Sutker (1998) is significant because it 
demonstrates how cognitive impairment is related to other symptom clusters. These 
authors studied attention and memory performance in Persian Gulf War veterans with 
and without PTSD diagnoses and reported that veterans with a PTSD diagnosis 
performed poorly relative to other groups on tasks of sustained attention, mental 
manipulation, and recall. They found a significant positive relationship between 
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cognitive intrusion and reexperiencing clusters, but the relationship between cognitive 
intrusion and numbing was negative. Finally, their results revealed an insignificant 
relationship between arousal and cognitive intrusion.  
Therefore, cognitive functions and their relationship to traumatic reactions 
seem to require more attention. Cognitive impairment might seem to resemble 
somatic complaints (Hough, Canino, Abueg, & Gusman, 1996) and the results of this 
study revealed significant correlations between cognitive impairment and somatic 
reactions. International studies from Latin American (e.g., Norris, Weisshaar, Conrad, 
Diaz, Murphy, & Ibanez, 2001; Jenkins, 1996) and Asian Countries (Abueg & Chun, 
1996) report overwhelming somatic symptoms as a result of natural and human made 
traumas.  
Although this study clearly suggests a different factor structure for Turkish 
earthquake survivors, the results need to be cross validated with larger data sets that 
include different types of trauma and different populations to whom more than one 
PTSD assessment tool was administered. Also, qualitative approaches can be very 
fruitful in terms of developing culturally sensitive measures that reflect the ways 
indigenous people who are exposed to traumatic events create a meaningful narrative 
of their experiences. 
Inconsistent results that are reported by previous studies and the results of this 
study regarding the symptom structures of PTSD suggest that the factor structure of 
PTSD may differ from population to population. Regardless of the cultural 
background of the population and the types of traumatic events, PTSD symptoms are 
manifested by the survivors, although the ways that people experience PTSD 
symptoms differ from population to population. It is difficult to conclude at this point 
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whether the cultural background of Turkish earthquake survivors is solely responsible 
for the different factor structure given the fact that a variety of factor structures were 
reported even by the studies that looked at North American populations. Furthermore, 
like most other disaster studies, this study could not compare the results of factor 
analyses in another equivalent cross-cultural sample in terms of content, 
conceptualization, scale, technical and normative equivalencies (for more discussion 
on kinds of equivalencies, see Keane, Kaloupek, and Weathers, 1996).  
However, the impacts of culture on traumatic reactions cannot be ignored. The 
current literature, which is mostly anthropological on emotions, culture and 
psychopathology, shows that there are very clear cultural variations in human’s 
traumatic reactions, manifestation of symptoms, and ways of coping with 
psychological difficulties. At this point in time, it is believed that PTSD is both a 
universal and culture-bound syndrome (Marsella, Friedman, Gerrity, & Scurfield, 
1996). It is vital to keep these ethnocultural variations in mind because prevention 
and treatment models rely on the diagnostic formulations of PTSD.  
5.3 RISK FACTORS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PTSD 
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were utilized in this study to test the 
contributions of several factors to the development of PTSD. Hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses allow for the control of the effects from demographic variables 
and explain the variance contributed by each predictor over and above the controlled 
variables. 
5.3.1 Personal Factors 
For this study, it was hypothesized that age and gender would be significantly 
related to PTSD. Age was not significantly correlated to PTSD and only a trend was 
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found for the relationship between gender and PTSD, with women being more likely 
to report PTSD symptoms than men.  
The current literature provided inconclusive results concerning the relative 
vulnerability of different age groups. While some researchers report that due to a lack 
of resources, older people are more vulnerable to trauma (e.g., Cohen & Ahearn, 
1980), other researchers claim that younger adults are more vulnerable (e.g., Knight, 
Gatz, Heller, & Bengtson, 2000) because they bear more responsibilities for their 
children and elderly family members. Also, some researchers suggest a curvilinear 
relationship between age and traumatic reactions (Thompson, Norris, & Hanacek, 
1993). The results of this study are in line with studies that failed to find any 
relationship between age and PTSD (Miller, Turner, & Kimball, 1981; Ollendick & 
Hoffman, 1982). It is important to note that the age variable for this study was 
skewed, with the participants of the study being relatively young. While the range for 
age was 17 to 61 years old, about 75% of the participants were 35 years old or 
younger. However, square root transformation of the age variable did not change the 
relationship between age and PTSD scores.  
Although this study also failed to confirm the relationship between gender and 
posttraumatic stress disorders, a trend was found: women tend to report more PTSD 
symptoms than men. Previous studies offer somewhat inconsistent results about this 
relationship but the majority of the studies report that women are more likely to 
develop psychological difficulties after traumatic events. The studies in which women 
are found to be more vulnerable to PTSD examined mostly human-made trauma 
where women are more likely to be the victims of violence, such as rape and domestic 
violence. However, disaster studies report no direct adverse effect on women 
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(Solomon, Smith, Robins, & Fischbach, 1987; Horowitz, Wilner, Kaltreider, & 
Alvarez, 1980).  
In addition to the type of trauma, previous studies discussed several mediating 
effects between gender and PTSD, such as symptom types (Gibbs, 1989; Manuel, 
Anderson, 1993; Myers, Weissman, Tisherler, 1984), progress of recovery (Krause, 
1987), timing of measure, demographic variables such as education level and 
economic level, and finally pre-disaster functioning (Phifer, 1990).  Regarding this 
literature, Phifer (1990) maintains “virtually any pattern of sex differences imaginable 
has been found in prior research” (p. 413).  However, his study on older populations 
found that women and men do not differ in symptoms of depression and/or anxiety. 
He explains that controlling for pre-disaster functioning might be the cause of the 
differences found between the results of his study and those of previous studies, 
because in previous studies the predisaster psychological functioning was not being 
controlled.  
A Meta-analytic study by Brewin, Andrews, and Valentine (2000), which 
examines the risk factors for PTSD, indicates that a greater effect size for the female 
gender is likely to be found when researchers utilize structured interviews rather than 
use self-report questionnaires. Unlike age and gender, education level was found to be 
significantly related to PTSD. Participants with lower education levels reported more 
severe levels of PTSD. This finding is in line with previous studies by Lewin, Carr, 
and Webster (1997) and Phifer (1990).  
5.3.2 Characteristics of The Traumatic Event 
As predicted, the more damage and personal losses that survivors of the 
earthquake were exposed to, the more PTSD symptoms survivors showed after the 
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earthquake. Exposure to the traumatic event is one of DSM’s criteria (Criterion A) 
and has been a controversial aspect of PTSD formulation. The reason for this 
controversy is that many people who witnessed/experienced the same traumatic event 
do not manifest pathological symptoms. Researchers discussed several explanations 
for this matter, such as the types of traumatic events studied and methodological 
difficulties (how to measure and/or conceptualize “exposure”). Also, the type of 
traumatic event seems to be related to different kinds of psychological difficulties 
(see Briere & Elliott, 2000, for a summary). More recent research argues that the 
individual’s unique experiences during the traumatic event is more likely to predict 
PTSD than only being physically present during the event and/or the magnitude of the 
disaster itself. For example, Briere and Elliott (2000) found that disaster 
characteristics such as physical injury, fear of death, and property loss were better 
predictors of psychopathology than the type of disastrous event even after controlling 
for past violence history. 
Unlike most other studies in which only one or two aspects of exposure to 
disasters were measured, this study included more comprehensive levels of exposure 
by incorporating psychological distress due to physical damage to the geographical 
area and the place of residency, physical injuries to themselves and family members, 
death of family members, and inconveniences in daily life due to the earthquake. The 
results of this study clearly indicate that even 2 years after the earthquake, the level of 
exposure is closely associated with PTSD and general stress.  
Examining the level of exposure and the distress caused by the disaster is 
crucial because unlike other types of psychological problems, PTSD has a clear 
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starting point, a traumatic event, and thus it is important to understand how people 
experience and interpret the traumatic event. 
5.3.3 Personality Factors 
As hypothesized, earthquake survivors who ruminate are more likely to have 
PTSD regardless of their demographic characteristics such as gender, education and 
economical level. The results of this study are in line with Nolen-Hoeksema and 
Morrow ‘s (1991) study in which a ruminative style was found to be a significant 
predictor of both depression and PTSD after the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake. 
People who ruminate are more likely to be at risk to the development of PTSD 
because rumination is a passive and repetitive way of dealing with emotional 
upheavals (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999). Previous studies established that 
ruminators are more likely to be pessimistic, to be unwilling to engage in activities 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993), to be poor problem solvers due to negative 
self-criticism, to self-blame for the problems, and to have low self-confidence and 
perceived control (Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999).  
Social sharing is defined as the opposite of rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Davis, 1999; Lepore, Silver, Wortman, & Wayment, 1996; Rime, 1997). In light of 
the results obtained from this study and from previous studies, people who do not 
share their traumatic experiences but instead passively ruminate about them are more 
prone to PTSD. As discussed in the literature review section, cognitive theories 
explain that rumination might be responsible for intrusive thoughts and rebounding 
effects. People with PTSD suffer from two distinctive emotional experiences: 
reexperiencing and suppression. Since reexperencing the trauma creates intense 
negative emotions, trauma survivors try to suppress or avoid any trauma related 
 93
 
thoughts. However, attempts to suppress trauma related thoughts or emotions creates 
a vicious cycle. This cycle can be broken by sharing the trauma related thoughts and 
emotions in a supportive environment. As explained earlier, when people express 
their thoughts and emotions, they reconstruct their cognitive schema (Greenberg, 
Wothman, & Stone, 1996) and develop habituation (Roemer & Borkovec, 1994). 
Social sharing also reduces both psychological distress (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 
1999) and somatic complaints (Pennebaker, 1995). 
In this sense, it is not surprising that suppression as a type of emotion 
regulation is also found to be negatively related to the level of PTSD. In other words, 
people who suppress their feelings tend to report more PTSD symptoms than people 
who do not suppress. The other type of emotion regulation, reappraisal, was not found 
to be associated with PTSD.  
 Emotion regulation is described as a process in which people influence their 
emotions in terms of how and when they express them (Gross, 1998). Suppression 
and reappraisal are two different ways of regulating emotions. While suppression is a 
“response-focused emotion regulation” and occurs after the emotion is already 
generated as a result of the event, reappraisal is a process where regulation is initiated 
before the emotion is generated. In an experimental setting, Richards and Gross 
(2000) examined the impacts of suppression and reappraisal on cognitive functioning. 
They demonstrated that while suppression negatively impacted the cognitive 
functioning, primarily through poorer memory, reappraisal had no adverse effect on 
cognitive functioning, such as verbal performance or cued-recall memory. The 
authors explained that suppression requires more extensive activation of cognitive 
resources to monitor and control emotions than does reappraisal and thus relative to 
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reappraisal, suppression leads people to perform poorly on the cognitive tasks. 
Reappraisal may have relatively fewer costs than suppression. Moreover, the authors 
discussed that people who used suppression as a way of regulating their emotions 
might have relatively more difficulties in social relationships because these cognitive 
difficulties impair their communication skills. 
In light of these findings, it can be speculated that suppression is negatively 
associated with PTSD but reappraisal is not because suppression consumes more 
cognitive resources than reappraisal. Lanius and Hopper’s (2002) study of 
neuroimaging of PTSD reports more brain activity during the suppression state than 
during a hyperarousal state. They offer evidence from a neurobiological perspective. 
Also, this study revealed a significant positive correlation between cognitive 
impairment and suppression. Reappraisal, however, was found to be correlated with 
cognitive impairment, which is found as an individual factor for this study. Therefore, 
this study suggests that the relationship between emotion regulation and PTSD 
differs, depending on the type of emotion regulation being utilized. 
As predicted, meta-mood traits are associated with the development of PTSD. 
For this study, meta-mood traits were measured as clarity in discriminating feelings, 
attention to feelings and mood repairs. The results of this study revealed that clarity in 
discriminating feelings and belief that mood can be repaired were negatively 
associated with severity of PTSD. Attention to feelings, however, was not related to 
level of PTSD, meaning that people who attend to their feelings neither benefited nor 
were harmed by them.  
Earlier studies discussed that beliefs and attitudes about emotions directly 
related to emotional experiences (Kelly & Kahn, 1994) as well as physical health 
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(Salovey, Detweiler, Steward, & Rothman, 2000) and reported similar research 
findings to our study. The effects of meta-mood in war-induced posttraumatic stress 
disorders were studied by Ansorge, Litz, and Orsillo (1996) for veterans with and 
without PTSD diagnoses and demonstrated that dysfunctional attitudes such as 
problems with affect tolerance and affect regulation were related to PTSD. In other 
words, veterans with PTSD in their sample were found to be less clear about their 
emotional states, have less acceptance for their emotions, and were less likely to 
repair their negative emotions.  
Similarly, Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, and Palfai (1997) studied meta-
mood traits in an experimental setting with a non-clinical sample and reported a 
negative relationship between clarity in discriminating feelings and intrusive or 
ruminative thoughts. Mood repair was also found to be associated with lower levels 
of negative affect but attention was not. The authors speculated that clarity and mood 
repair buffer the impact of a stressful event. Clarity and mood-repair help people to 
reduce their ruminative thoughts because “they know how they feel; they do not need 
to engage in prolonged rumination in order to figure it out. Rather, they can turn their 
attentional resources toward coping and minimizing the impact of the stressful event” 
(p.146). Additionally, these authors claimed that people are more likely to attend to 
aversive feelings that exacerbate stressful experiences. 
5.4 BRIEF SUMMARY AND CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In summary, level of exposure, rumination, and emotional experiences such as 
suppression, clarity in discriminating feelings, and mood repair are closely associated 
with the development of PTSD. While people with high levels of exposure, 
ruminative personalities, and suppressive type of emotion regulations are more likely 
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to report PTSD symptoms, people with a high clarity in discriminating feelings and a 
belief that mood can be repaired are less likely to report PTSD symptoms.  The 
results of this study contribute evidence to cognitive and emotional processing 
theories in terms of clarifying the relationship between these factors and PTSD.  
Cognitive theories of posttraumatic reactions maintain that individuals 
evaluate, interpret, and integrate new information based on their preexisting schema, 
which consist of past experiences, beliefs, and assumptions regarding self, safety, and 
future events.  When people are exposed to traumatic events, evaluating and/or 
interpreting the new information takes a long time and results in great stress due to 
the contradictory and confrontational nature of traumatic experiences to their 
preexisting schema. The greater the confrontation, the larger the resulting stress. In 
other words, the greater the severity of exposure to the traumatic event, the greater the 
severity of PTSD. Until the traumatic experience is integrated into their existing 
schema, it is stored in the active memory and continuously produces intrusive and 
emotionally upsetting thoughts.  
As a first step mental health professionals who work with trauma survivors 
may want to assess where the survivors are in this integration process and to identify 
the factors that make the integration process difficult for the survivor, such as the 
severity of exposure. Survivors who experience numbing symptoms may need 
different types of interventions than survivors experience reexperiencing/ arousal 
symptoms. More individual specific assessments and treatment approaches may be 
more effective because individuals’ cultural background and personality 
characteristics may lead to different symptom manifestations. It seems that cognitive 
impairments and other somatic symptoms require more attention during the 
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assessment process because international survivors especially may experience or 
report relatively more somatic symptoms.  
Not every person exposed to a traumatic event develops PTSD. Therefore, it is 
important to examine individual characteristics that might contribute to the 
development of PTSD. Mental health professionals may want to pay close attention to 
ruminative characteristics of survivors. This study showed that people with 
ruminative tendencies are more likely to develop PTSD for several reasons: they are 
more likely to focus on their negative moods; they are more likely to take pessimistic 
views; their unwanted thoughts are more likely to be intrusive when emotions are 
attached to them; and, they are less likely to express their trauma related thoughts and 
emotions. Rumination, therefore, exacerbates intrusive thoughts and intense 
emotional upheavals. Helping survivors to replace ruminative coping skill with more 
effective skills can help survivors. 
In order to cope with intrusive thoughts and emotional upheavals, trauma 
survivors operate several emotion regulation strategies. However, not every type of 
emotion regulation facilitates the coping process. Suppression is one emotion 
regulation strategy and perhaps the most widely used. Even though suppression is 
utilized to cope with intrusive thoughts and emotions, it hinders the recovery from 
PTSD because it increases the likelihood of rebounding effects and consumes a 
substantial amount of cognitive resources. Recovery from trauma becomes even more 
difficult if people hold negative attitudes about their emotions. In particular, not being 
clear about emotions and being unable to repair negative moods increases the chance 
of maintaining PTSD over time. In this sense, it is important for mental health 
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professionals to help survivors to develop mindfulness about their emotional 
experiences and effective emotion regulation skills.     
5.5 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES 
This study has several limitations. First, the participants in the study were not 
recruited randomly. The results of this study rely on volunteer participants who may 
not necessarily represent the population of earthquake survivors. The earthquake 
survivors who refused to participate may differ in some important ways.  
Furthermore, the results from the factor analyses needs to be validated with a 
larger sample size to create more stable results and be cross validated with different 
populations who were exposed to different types of trauma using different measures 
(other self-reports and structural interviews). The sample used for the factor analyses 
was limited in number and thus adult and children data were combined to increase the 
likelihood of obtaining stable results. Even though examining the adult and children 
samples in terms of their comparableness revealed no severe differences, the results 
of this present study should be confirmed with a larger sample. 
This study carries the limitations of any study in which only self-report 
measures are used. Heppner, Kivilgan, and Wampold (1992) argue that self-reports 
are vulnerable to response bias. The participants of this study may have consciously 
or unconsciously chose to respond in a way that makes them appear more or less 
traumatized by the earthquake. For example, earthquake survivors were given 
material compensation or emotional support by the government or other aid 
organizations based on their loss.  
This study is correlational in nature. The results obtained in this study indicate 
relations between the predictors and the criterion variable. The choices of variables 
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are in a sense arbitrary and thus causality cannot be established. There may be effects 
of some unmeasured variables to the development of PTSD such as other personality 
variables or availability of immediate and/or long-term social support systems for the 
survivors. It is possible that people may feel more comfortable expressing certain 
thoughts and feelings to certain people.  Future longitudinal studies can provide 
greater certainty for understanding the development of PTSD and its relationship with 
risk/resiliency factors.  
Finally, this study is a preliminary study that examines the diagnostic and 
developmental appearances of PTSD as a result of a natural disaster in an 
international sample. The basic premise for this study was that PTSD is both a 
universal and culture-bound construct (Marsella, Friedman, Gerrity, & Scurfield, 
1996) and thus this study attempted to test the PTSD formulization for Turkish 
culture. Although the results of the study show that there are some variations in terms 
of symptom structures of PTSD, it does not give a clear picture in terms of where 
these differences are coming from. Also, the quantitative nature of the study does not 
allow clarification of the understanding of Turkish indigenous people’s specific 
trauma experiences and their interpretation of these experiences. Specific responses 
were gathered for the specific questions asked. There may be some important 
questions that were not asked in this study. Therefore, future quantitative studies with 
in depth interviews may be more fruitful in terms of identifying culture specific 
symptoms and addressing the meaning of traumatic experiences itself. 
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Table 1: Fit Summaries for DSM-IV Model and Exploratory Models 
 df S-B χ2 S-B Diff CFI RMSEA RCFI χ2/df
DSM-Based 
Model 
     
1 104 875.3*** 1603.1*** .611 .549 .624 8.42
2 101 350.8*** 524.5*** .867 .093 .878 3.47
3 98 205.4*** -0.6 .942 .062 .948 2.10
   
 
   
 
Exploratory 
Model 
  
 
   
 
4 132 599.4*** 2421.3*** .801 .110 .815 4.54
5 129 264.4*** 335*** .920 .070 .946 2.05
Note. *** p < .001. S-B X2 = Satorra-Bentler Chi-Square, S-B Diff  = Difference 
between previous model and current model, indicates improvement in fit. CFI = 
Comparative Fit Index. RSMEA = Root Square Mean Error of Approximation. RCFI 
= Robust Comparative Fit Index.  
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Figure 1: DSM-IV Model
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Figure 2. Final DSM-based Model 
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Figure 3: Initial Exploratory Model 
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Table 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis  
Component   
1 2 3 Communality M 
I get really anxious when something reminds 
me about the earthquake 
.78   .67 2.07
The earthquake makes me upset and nervous .76   .66 1.84
I feel that the earthquake will happen again at 
any time 
.74   .64 1.83
I feel upset or anxious when thinking about the 
earthquake 
.72   .61 1.79
I reexperience disturbing scenes physically or 
emotionally 
.61   .54 1.30
I feel alright when I think about the earthquake -.59   .52 1.57
The earthquake is something that would upset 
most people 
.58   .41 3.37
Thoughts about the earthquake come back to 
me even when I don't want them to 
.58   .54 1.49
I want to stay away from things that make me 
remember what happened 
.56   .33 2.12
I startle more easily or feel more jumpy or 
nervous 
.54  .44 .56 1.55
I sleep well -.51   .39 2.52
My memory is as good as it used to be  .81  .66 3.07
I can express my feelings just like I used to 
express them before the earthquake 
 .75  .58 2.89
My concentration is as good as it used to be  .75  .65 2.94
I can make good decisions  .65  .53 2.64
I feel as good about things before the 
earthquake 
 .49  .43 2.55
I feel alone and do not want to relate to anyone   .79 .68 0.53
Fears related to the earthquake make me numb   .70 .55 0.64
I have bad dreams about the earthquake or 
other bad dreams 
.42  .46 .51 0.86
I feel guilty because I survived and did not 
work hard to save others 
   .21 0.61
Rotated Eigenvalue 5.09 3.26 2.33   
Rotated % variance explained 25.5 16.3 11.6   
Note. Values under .4 deleted. 
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Figure 4. Final Exploratory Model  
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Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9a 9b 9c 10 10a 10b
1. Age 1
2. Gender -.046 1
3. Marital Status
-.305** -.066 1
4. Number of 
Children
.666** .025 -.429** 1
5. Education Level -.105 .102 .161 -.394** 1
6. Economic Level .274** .042 -.065 .379** -.452** 1
7. Exposure Level -.069 -.076 -.042 .071 -.333** .236* 1
8. Rumination -.020 -.038 .023 .142 -.439** .219* .415** 1
9. Meta-Mood Traits -.012 -.231* .038 -.038 .296** -.285** -.260* -.311** 1
    9a. Attention -.135 -.319** .127 -.087 .241* -.265* -.181 -.067 .765** 1
    9b. Repair .122 -.069 -.061 .059 .120 -.150 -.111 -.355** .612** .174 1
    9c. Clarity .052 -.050 -.030 -.018 .250* -.174 -.251* -.327** .753** .274** .377** 1
10. Emotion 
Regulation
-.063 -.013 .133 .000 -.111 .061 .176 .176 .063 .104 .123 -.082 1
  10a. Reappraisal -.040 -.083 .068 .023 -.106 .031 .136 .148 .143 .143 .117 .045 .816** 1
  10b. Supression -.062 .055 .122 .015 -.196 .138 .256* .336** -.167 -.017 -.092 -.270** .707** .303** 1
M 31.09 1.46 1.48 1.98 3.20 3.07 20.01 47.69 141.22 60.37 28.15 52.67 49.78 31.24 12.61
SD 8.87 .50 .56 1.23 1.39 .86 4.53 11.42 20.70 11.98 6.88 9.69 9.72 6.06 4.38
Note:  N s vary (minimum = 147, maximum = 157).
*p  < .05   **p   < .01
Table 3: Correlation Coefficients and Means and Standard Deviations for Predictors Variables
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Table 4: Correlation Coefficients, Means and Standard Deviations for SCL-R and RIS
Variable 1 1a 1b 1c 1d 2 2a 2b 2c
1. SCL-R 1.000
  1a. Somatic .864** 1.000
  1b. Depression .917** .674** 1.000
  1c. Anxiety .795** .561** .666** 1.000
  1d. Hostility .792** .599** .751** .499** 1.000
2. RIS .696** .553** .617** .696** .534** 1.000
  2a. Reexperiencing .650** .502** .553** .702** .476** .930** 1.000
  2b. Cognitive .465** .366** .435** .449** .378** .736** .505** 1.000
Impairment
  2c. Numbing .669** .578** .614** .573** .509** .767** .657** .472** 1.000
M 127.93 35.63 39.03 24.22 20.74 37.73 15.5 8.21 78.35
SD 51.97 17.88 18.01 12.94 8.25 13.43 7.36 4.87 24.83
Note:  N s vary (minimum = 153, maximum = 156).
*p  < .05   **p   < .01
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix for Predictors and the SCL-R and RIS
SCL-R Somatic Depression Anxiety Hostility RIS Reexp.
Cognitive 
Impairment Numbing
.028 .126 -.016 -.015 -.047 -.006 -.029 .007 .031
-.236* -.202 -.180 -.238* -.227* -.167 -.179 -.131 -.110
.005 .049 -.012 .041 -.100 -.086 -.077 -.106 -.040
.150 .235* .069 .082 .108 .195 .140 .156 .242*
-.380** -.408** -.271** -.345** -.310** -.385** -.322** -.277** -.457**
.230* .203 .188 .262* .121 .235* .211* .152 .286**
.482** .379** .445** .461** .394** .515** .464** .406** .451**
.661** .555** .640** .466** .599** .575** .493** .383** .622**
-.357** -.287** -.312** -.362** -.276** -.328** -.260* -.332** -.326**
Attention -.094 -.102 -.067 -.153 -.026 -.118 -.081 -.183 -.125
Repair -.330** -.269** -.284** -.224* -.362** -.298** -.247* -.267** -.272**
Clarity -.408** -.293** -.382** -.424** -.295** -.341** -.279** -.294** -.344**
.167 .162 .123 .173 .077 .183 .201 .049 .206
Reappraisal .165 .128 .142 .171 .116 .150 .194 .010 .199
Supression .242* .250* .209* .162 .161 .289** .215* .203 .301**
Note:  N s vary (minimum = 151, maximum = 157).
*p  < .05   **p   < .01
Age
Gender
Marital Status
Number of 
Children
SCL-R Subscales RIS Subscales
Meta-Mood 
Traits
Emotion 
Regulation
Variable
Education 
Level
Economic 
Level
Exposure Level
Rumination
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Table 6: The Impact of Gender on PTSDa 
Predictors R2 change p β p
Step 1 .160 .0001
   # of children  .016 .857
   Education level  -.349 .0001
   Economic level  .083 .346
Step 2 .016 .093
   Gender  -.130 .093
Note: Adj. R2 for final model = .153, F (4,143) = 7.6, p = .0001.   
a Dependent Variable:  RIS total Scale Score 
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Table 7: The Impact of Level of Exposure on PTSDa 
Predictors R2 change p β p
Step 1 .174 .0001
   # of children  .027 .759
   Education level  -.323 .0001
   Economic level  .086 .332
   Gender                    -.129       .099 
Step 2 .168 .0001
   Level of exposure  .447 .0001
Note: Adj. R2 for final model =.306,  F (5,140) = 14.521, p = .0001  
a Dependent Variable:  RIS total Scale Score 
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Table 8: The Impact of Rumination on PTSDa 
Predictors R2 change p β p
Step 1 .172 .0001
   # of children  .371 .711
   Education level  -.324 .0001
   Economic level  .092 .307
   Gender                      .111      .156 
Step 2 .211 .0001
   Rumination   .513 .0001
Note: Adj. R2 for final model =.362,  F (5,139) = 17.372, p = 0001  
a Dependent Variable:  RIS total Scale Score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 113 
 
 
Table 9: The Impact of Suppression on PTSDa 
Predictors R2 change p β p
Step 1 .169 .0001
   # of children  .022 .800
   Education level  -.320 .001
   Economic level  .094 .292
   Gender                     -.123      .114 
Step 2 .045 .005
   Suppression   .220 .005
Note: Adj. R2 for final model =.186,  F (5,140) = 7.64, p = .0001  
a Dependent Variable:  RIS total Scale Score 
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Table 10: The Impact of Clarity on PTSDa 
Predictors R2 change p β p
Step 1 .183 .0001
   # of children  .037 .676
   Education level  -.317 .001
   Economic level  .093 .297
   Gender                    -.147      .064 
Step 2 .211 .0001
   Clarity     -.29 .0001
Note: Adj. R2 for final model =.234,  F (5,135) = 9.56, p = .0001  
a Dependent Variable:  RIS total Scale Score 
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Table 11: The Impact of Mood Repair on PTSDa 
Predictors R2 change p β p
Step 1 .182 .0001
   # of children  .033 .706
   Education level  -.317 .001
   Economic level  .100 .259
  Gender                    -.142 .071
Step 2 .078 .0001
   Mood-repair   -.286 .0001
Note: Adj. R2 for final model =.233,  F (5,137) = 9.61, p = .0001  
a Dependent Variable:  RIS total Scale Score 
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Table 12: Summary of  Research Findings: Hierarchical Regression Analyses 
 
  
Predictors: β R
2 Change P 
Level of Exposure 
 
.447 .168 .0001 
Rumination 
 
.513 .212 .0001 
Repair 
 
-.286 .078 .001 
Clarity 
 
-.289 .211 .0001 
Suppression 
 
.220 .045 .005 
Gender 
 
-.130 .016 .093 
Criterion variable: The Reaction Index Scale 
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Appendix A 
Turkish Questionnaires 
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1999 Depreminin Türk lnsanları Üzerindeki Etkileri 
 
 
Yaşınız_______   Medeni durumuz________ 
 
Cinsiyetiniz_____   Kaç çocuğunuz var?_______ 
 
Eğitim dereceniz: ilkokul____ 
Orta okul____ 
Lise____ 
Üniversite___ 
Master_____ 
Doktora____ 
Diğer (lütfen belirtiniz)_____ 
 
 
Ekonomik durumuz : çok iyi____ iyi_____orta_____ortanın altı______kötü_____
  
 
 
 
Aşağıdaki soruları duygularınızı en iyi şekilde, aşağıdaki derecelendirme 
sistemini kullanarak yanıtlayınız: Eğer okuduğunuz cümle size hiç uymuyorsa 1, 
çok az uyuyor ise 2, biraz uyuyor ise 3, tam ortada ise 4, oldukça uyuyor ise 5, 
oldukca çok uyuyor ise 6 ve tamamen uyuyor ise 7 kullanınız. Sizi en iyi yansıtan 
sayıyı her cümlenin başindaki boşluğa yazınız. 
 
 
         1-----------------2------------------3------------------4------------------5------------------6------------------7 
Kesinlikle nötürüm Kesinlikle 
Bana Uymuyor,  Bana uyuyor 
     
 
 
1. ____     İnanıyorum ki, yaşadığım deprem birçok insanda ruhsal sorunlara neden 
olabilecek kadar sarsıcı idi. 
 
2. ____     Deprem sırasında yaşadığım korkularım hala devam ediyor. 
 
3. ____     Depremde beni fiziksel ve ruhsal olarak sarsan sahneleri tekrar tekrar 
yaşıyorum. 
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4. ____     Depremde yaşadıklarımla ilgili rahatsız edici düşünceler, onlardan 
kaçınmak için gösterdiğim tüm çabaya rağmen hiç aklımdan çıkmıyor. 
 
5. ____     Deprem ile ilgili rüyalar peşimi bir türlü bırakmıyor. 
 
6. ____     Her an, tekrar deprem olacakmış gibi şeyler düşünüyor ve hissediyorum. 
 
7. ____     Depremden önce benim için önemli olan spor yapmak (futbol, basketbol 
gibi), kitap okumak, kağıt oynamak, sinemaya gitmek gibi uğraşılar ile şimdi de 
ilgileniyorum. 
 
8. ____     Deprem ile ilgili korkular beni uyuşturdu; hiçbir şey hissedemez hale 
geldim. 
 
9. ____     Deprem sonrasında, daha önce görüştüğüm insanlarla görüşmez hale 
geldim. Başkaları ile olan bütün ilişkilerimi kestim. 
 
10. ____     Duygularımı depremden önceki kadar rahat ve özgürce ifade 
edebiliyorum. 
 
11. ____     Depremden öncekine kıyasla çok daha kolay sinirleniyor ve ürküyorum.  
 
12. ____     İyi  uyuyorum. 
 
13. ____     Olanları önlemek için daha fazla çaba göstermediğim ve başkalarından 
daha az acı çektiğim için kendimi kötü ve suçlu hissediyorum. 
 
14. ____     Hafızam depremden önceki kadar iyi. (Olayları, isimleri vb. depremden 
önceki kadar iyi hatırlıyorum). 
 
15. ____     Konsantrasyonum depremden önceki kadar iyi. 
 
16. ____     Bana deprem anını hatırlatabilecek uğraşılardan kaçınıyorum. 
 
17. ____     Depreme benzeyen ve depremi hatırlatan her durumda endişe ve sıkıntı 
duyuyorum. 
 
18. ____     Depremle ilgili endişe, huzursuzluk, sıkıntı ve üzüntü duyguları 
taşıyorum. 
 
19. ____     Depremi düşündüğümde rahatım ve endişe duymuyorum. 
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20. ____     Benim için herhangi bir konuda karar vermek depremden önceki kadar 
kolay. 
 
Aşağıdaki soruları EVET ya da HAYIR olarak yanıtlayınız.. 
 
21. Endişe, sıkıntı ve üzüntü duygularınız depremden sonraki 6 ay içindemi başladı? 
 
 EVET   HAYIR 
 
22. 21.soruya  yanıtınız EVET ise, son belirtiler olaydan sonraki 6 ay içinde geçti mi? 
 
 EVET   HAYIR 
 
23.Olaydan sonra endişe, sıkıntı, üzüntü belirtileriniz 6 aydan fazla sürdü mü? 
 
 EVET   HAYIR 
 
24.Olaydan 6 ay sonra ortaya çıkan endişe, korku, sıkıntı gibi belirtileriniz oldu mu? 
  
EVET   HAYIR        
 
25. Deprem sonrası bir uzmanla görüştünüz mü veya profesyonel bir yardım aldınız 
mı? 
 
 EVET   HAYIR 
 
26. 25. soruya yanıtınız EVET ise, aldığınız yardımın aşağıdakilerden hangileri 
(birden fazla olabilir) olduğunu işaretleyiniz. 
 
a) İlaç  
b) Psikolojik yardım 
c) Dini yardım 
d) Sosyal yardım 
e) Maddi yardım 
 
 
Bu bölümde, size duygusallık ve duygularınızı nasıl kontrol ettiğiniz hakkında 
bazı sorular sormak istiyoruz.  Özellikle duyğusallığın iki yönü üzerinde 
duruyoruz. İlki sizin duygusal deneyiminiz, başka bir deyişle neler hissettiğiniz.  
Diğeri ise duygusallığı konuşmanız, davranışlarınız ya da mimiklerinizle nasil 
ifade ettiğiniz. Genelde sorular birbirine çok benziyor gibi görünebilir ama özde 
birbirinden çok farklıdırlar.  Lütfen her soruyu aşağıdaki derecelendirme 
sistemini kullanarak yanıtlayınız: Eğer okuduğunuz cümle size hiç uymuyorsa 1, 
çok az uyuyor ise 2, biraz uyuyor ise 3, tam ortada ise 4, oldukça uyuyor ise 5, 
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oldukca çok uyuyor ise 6 ve tamamen uyuyor ise 7 kullanınız. Sizi en iyi yansıtan 
sayıyı her cümlenin başindaki boşluğa yazınız.  
 
 
         1-----------------2------------------3------------------4------------------5------------------6------------------7 
Kesinlikle nötürüm Kesinlikle 
Bana Uymuyor,  Bana uyuyor 
     
 
1. ____     Çoğu zaman duygularımı kontrol altında tutma eğilimindeyim. 
2. ____    Kendimi iyi hissettmek istedğim zamanlarda, yani mutlu ve neşeli olmak 
istediğimde anlarda düşüncelerimi değiştiririm. 
3.  ____     Duygularımı başkasıyla paylaşmam, hep içimde saklarım. 
4.  ____    Kendimi iyi hissetmediğim  zamanlarda yani üzüntülü ya da kızgın 
olduğum anlarda düşüncelerimi değistirir, farklı şeyler düşünürüm. 
5.  ____    Kendimi iyi hissettiğim zamanlarda, duygularımı saklamam. 
6.  ____    Stresli olduğum zamanlarda, kendimi neden stresli olduğum konuda 
düşünmeye zorlayarak  sakinlesmeye çalışırım.  
7. ____     Duygularımı dışarıya vurmayarak kontrol altına alıyorum. 
8. ____    Kendimi iyi hissettiğim zamanlarda, beni etkileyen olaylar hakkındaki 
düşüncelerim değişir.  
9. ____     Hiç bir zaman duygularımı kontrol altında tutmaya çalışmadım.   
10. ____     İçinde bulunduğum durumu düşünüp anlamaya çalışarak duygularımı 
kontrol altında tutuyorum. 
11. ____    Kendimi iyi hissetmediğim  zamanlarda, duygularımı dışarıya 
yansıtmamaya özen gösteriyorum.  
12. ____    Genelde duygularımı çok iyi kontrol ediyorum.  
13. ____    Duygularımı kontrol etmek istediğim zamanlarda, beni etkileyen durum 
hakkındaki düşüncelerim pek değişmiyor.  
14. ____    Kendimi iyi hissetmek istediğim zamanlarda beni etkileyen durum 
hakkındaki düşüncelerim değişiyor.  
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Yönerge: İnsanlar kötü bir deneyim yaşadıklarında bir sürü farklı şey yapar ya da 
düşünürler. Lütfen aşağıdaki cümleleri okuyup, son iki hafta içinde, belirtilenleri ne 
kadar sıklıkta yaptığınızı aşagidaki derecelendirme sistemini kullanarak yanıtlayıniz. 
Size en iyi uyan sayıyı cümlelerin başlarindaki boşluklara yaziniz. Lütfen, ne 
yapmanız gerektiğini değil, gerçekte ne yaptığınızı belirtin. 
 
1= Hiçbir Zaman     2=Bazen     3=Çoğunlukla     4= Neredeyse Her Zaman 
 
1. ____    Kendini yalnız hissettiğini ne kadar sık düşünüyorsun? 
 
2. ____    “Kendimi, hiç bir işimi yapamayacak kadar kötü hissediyorum” diye 
ne kadar sık düşünüyorsun? 
 
3. ____    Ne kadar sık, yorgun ve ağrılarının olduğunu düşünüyorsun? 
 
4. ____    Herhangi bir şeye konsantre olmanın zor olduğunu ne kadar sık 
düşünüyorsun? 
 
5.  ____    Pasif ve motivasyondan yoksun olduğunu ne kadar sık düşünüyorsun? 
 
 
6. ____    Artık ne kadar duyarsızlaştığını ve hiçbir şey hissetmediğini ne kadar 
sık düşünüyorsun? 
 
7. ____    Bir işe niye başlayıp devam ettiremediğini ne kadar düşünüyorsun? 
 
8. ____     “Niye bu şekilde bir tepki gösteriyorum?” diye ne kadar sık 
düşünüyorsun?  
 
9. ____    Yalnız başına bir yerlere gidip “Kendimi niye böyle hissediyorum” 
diye ne kadar sık düşünüyorsun? 
 
10. ____    Ne kadar sık, düşüncelerini yazıp, çözümlemeye ve anlamaya 
çalışıyorsun? 
 
11. ____     “Niye benim problemlerim var da, diğer insanların yok” diye ne kadar 
sık düşünüyorsun? 
 
12. ____    Ne kadar sık, çok üzgün olduğunu düşünüyorsun? 
 
13. ____    Bütün eksikliklerini, başarısızlıklarını ve hatalarını ne kadar sık 
düşünüyorsun? 
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14. ____    Hiçbir şey yapmak istemediğini ne kadar sık düşünüyorsun? 
 
15. ____    Ne kadar sık, tek başına bir yere gidip duygularını anlamaya 
çalışıyorsun? 
 
16. ____     Ne kadar sık, kendine kızgın olduğunu düşünüyorsun? 
 
17. ____    Ne kadar sık, hüzünlü şarkılar dinliyorsun? 
 
18. ____    Ne kadar sık, kendini insanlardan ayırıp, bir köşeye çekilip, neden 
üzgün olduğunu anlamaya çalışıyorsun? 
 
19. ____    Ne kadar sık, hislerine yoğunlaşarak kendini anlamaya çalışıyorsun? 
 
DEPREMIN YARATTIĞI OLUMSUZ ETKILER 
 
1. Deprem, bulunduğunuz bölgeye ne kadar zarar verdi? 
 
1= Hiç 2=Az    3=Orta derecede 4=Çok Fazla 
 
2. Deprem sizin evinize ne kadar zarar verdi? 
 
1= hiç 2=az   3=orta derecede  4=çok fazla 
 
3. Depremde aile bireylerinizi veya yakın arkadaşlarınızı kaybetmekle ne kadar 
stres ve sıkıntı yaşadınız? 
 
1= hiç 2=az   3=orta derecede  4=çok fazla 
 
4. Aile bireylerinizin veya yakın arkadaşlarınızın depremde yaralanması size ne 
kadar stres ve de sıkıntı verdi?  
 
1= hiç 2=az   3=orta derecede  4=çok fazla 
 
5. Depremde kendinizin yaralanması size ne kadar stres, sıkıntı kaynağı oldu? 
 
1= hiç 2=az   3=orta derecede  4=çok fazla 
 
6.  Deprem yüzünden günlük yaşamınız ne kadar zorlaştı? 
1= hiç 2=az   3=orta derecede  4=çok fazla 
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Size zaman zaman herkese olabilecek bazı şikayetlerden bahsedeceğim. Lütfen 
dikkatle okuyunuz ve bunun size de son onbeş gün içerisinde olup olmadığını 
belirtiniz. 
 
 
 
         1-----------------2------------------3------------------4------------------5------------------6------------------7 
Kesinlikle nötürüm Kesinlikle 
Bana Uymuyor,  Bana uyuyor 
     
 
1. _____  Başağrısı 
2. _____  Sinirlilik ya da gerginlik 
3. _____  Baş dönmesi ya da baygınlık hali 
4. _____  Kolayca kızma ya da sinirlenme 
5. _____  Göğğüs ya da kalp bölgesinde ağrılar 
6. _____  Sokaklarda veya açık alanlarda korku hissi 
7. _____  Halsizlik  
8. _____  Yaşamınıza son verme düşünceleri 
9. _____  Depremle ilgili düşünce veya hayaller 
10. _____  İştahınızda azalma 
11. _____  Kolayca ağlama 
12. _____  Kapalı yerlerde korkuya kapılma 
13. _____  Bir neden olmaksızın aniden korkuya kapılma 
14. _____  Kontrol edemediğiniz öfkelenmeler 
15. _____  Evde yanlız kalmaktan korkma 
16. _____  Olanlardan dolayı kendinizi suçlama 
17. _____  Bel ağrısı 
18. _____  Yalnızlık duygusu 
19. _____  Karamsarlık  
20. _____  Herşey için endişelenme 
21. _____  Herşeye karşı ilgisizlik 
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22. _____  Kalp çarpıntısı 
23. _____  Bulantı ya da midenizde rahatsızlık 
24. _____  Adele (kas) ağrıları 
25. _____  Uykuya dalmada güçlük, rahat uyuyamama 
26. _____  Otobüs, tren gibi araçlarla yolculuk etme korkusu 
27. _____  Nefes almada güçlük 
28. _____  Sizi korkutan yerlerden / şeylerden kaçınma 
29. _____  Bedeninizin bazı yerlerinde uyuşma, karıncalanma olması 
30. _____  Boğazınıza birşey tıkanma hissi 
31. _____  Gelecek konusunda umutsuzluk 
32. _____  Ölüm veya ölüm düşünceleri 
33. _____  Aşırı yemek yeme 
34. _____  Sabah çok erken saatte isteğiniz dışında uyanma 
35. _____  Çarşı, pazar gibi yerlerde rahatsızlık duyma 
36. _____  Her işin bir yük gibi görünmesi 
37. _____  Sık sık tartışmaya girme 
38. _____  Başınıza kötü birşey gelecekmiş duygusu 
39. _____  Korkutucu düşünce ve hayallere kapılma 
40. _____  Yerinizde duramayacak ölçüde huzursuzluk hissi. 
 
Bu bölümde genel olarak insanların duyguları hakkında ne hissettikleri ve 
düşündüklerini anlamaya çalışıyoruz. Lütfen her cümleyi okuyup, bu cümleye 
ne kadar katılıp katılmadığınızı aşağidaki dereceleme sistemini kullanarak 
belirtiniz. 
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         1-----------------2------------------3------------------4------------------5------------------6------------------7 
Kesinlikle nötürüm Kesinlikle 
Bana Uymuyor,  Bana uyuyor 
     
 
 
1. _____  Duygular hayatı yönlendirir. 
2. _____  Ne kadar kötü hissedersem edeyim iyi şeyler düşünmeye çalışırım. 
3. _____  Genellikle ne hissettiğim konusunda karar veremem. 
4. _____  lnsanlar daha çok düşünüp daha az hissetseler onlar için daha iyi olur. 
5. _____  Üzgün olduğumda kendime hayattaki güzellikleri hatırlatırım. 
6. _____  Asla neler hissettiğimi söyleyemem. 
7. _____  Bazen neler hissettiğimi ifade edemem. 
8. _____  Hemen hemen her zaman ne hissttigimi tam olarak bilirim. 
9. _____  Bazen mutlu olmama rağmen çoğunlukla dışardan kötümsermişim gibi 
görünürüm. 
10. _____ Çoğunlukla ne hissettiğimi çok iyi bilirim. 
11. _____  Kendimi ne kadar kötü hissedersem edeyim, güzel şeyler düşünmeye 
çalışırım.  
12. _____  Ne hissettiğim konusunda karar veremediğim anlar çok nadirdir. 
13. _____  Duygularıma bir anlam veremem. 
14. _____  Bazen üzgün olmama rağmen, çoğunlukla dışardan iyimser görünürüm.  
15. _____  Duygular hakkında düşünmek genellikle zaman kaybıdır. 
16. _____  Üzgün olduğumda, hayattaki güzel şeylerin bir yalan olduğunu 
düşünürüm. 
17. _____  Duygular insanların zayıf yönleridir. 
18. _____  Sık sık duygularım hakkında düşünürüm. 
19. _____  Genellikle olaylar hakkındaki duygularımın farkındayımdır.  
20. _____  Neler hissettiğimi genellikle umursamam. 
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21. _____  Benim için duygularım ile başa çıkmanın en kolay yolu onları dolu dolu 
yaşamaktır. 
22. _____  O an neler hissettiğime bağlı olarak inanç ve düşüncelerim değişir. 
23. _____  Duygularım konusunda rahatımdır. 
24. _____  Asla duygularımın esiri olmam. 
25. _____  Genellikle herhangi bir konu hakkındaki duygularımı bilirim. 
26. _____  Duygular ınsanları yönlendirmemeli. 
27. _____  Nasıl hissettiğime çok önem veririm. 
28. _____  Duygularıma pek dikkat etmem. 
29. _____  lnsanların kalplerinden geçtiği gibi davranmaları gerektiğine inanırım. 
30. _____  Bence duygularına yada içinde bulunduğun ruh haline kafa yormaya 
değmez.        
 
Verdiğiniz hiç bir bilgi, hiç bir şekilde bir başkası ile paylaşılmayacaktır. 
Araştırmanın sonuçları değerlendirilirken hiç bir isim yada tanınmanıza neden 
olabilecek bilgi kullanılmayacaktır.  Katıldığınız için çok teşekkürler. 
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Appendix B 
English Versions of Questionnaires 
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Reaction Index Scale 
 
Please answer each question by indicating a number from 1 to 7 that describes your 
feelings best based on the scale below. Please be sure to answer all questions. 
 
 
         1-----------------2------------------3------------------4------------------5------------------6------------------7 
strongly neutral strongly 
disagree  agree 
     
 
 
1. ___I believe that the earthquake was an extreme stressor that would cause 
psychological problems to most people.  
 
2. ___Fears related to earthquake continue to occupy my mind. 
 
3. ___I reexperience disturbing scenes about the earthquake either physically or 
emotionally. 
 
4. ___Uncomfortable thoughts about my experiences in the earthquake seem to 
invade my mind in spite of efforts to keep it out. 
 
5. ___Dreams about my earthquake experiences keep coming back. 
 
6. ___I see or think of many things that make me feel as if my earthquake experiences 
are about to happen again. 
 
7. ___I keep interesting activities that were important before the earthquake 
experience, such as sports, e.g., bowling, going to football games, etc… 
 
8. ___Fears about earthquakes have left me numb. 
 
9. ___I am now more detached and less involved with other people than I was before 
the earthquake. 
 
10.___I express emotions and feelings as freely as I did before the earthquake. 
 
11. ___I seem jumpy, edgy, and more easily startled than before the earthquake. 
 
12. ___I sleep well. 
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13. ___I feel bad or guilty that I didn’t do more to try to prevent what happened or 
went through less than others. 
 
14. ___I remember things as well as I did before the earthquake. 
 
15. ___My concentration is as good as it was before the earthquake. 
 
16. ___I tend to avoid activities, which might make me remember my experience of 
the earthquake. 
 
17. ___When something resembles the earthquake or reminds me of the earthquake, 
feelings of distress increase in me. 
 
18. ___Feelings of distress about the earthquake occur. 
 
19. ___I am relaxed and without tension when I think of the earthquake. 
 
20. ___It is as easy for me to make decisions as it was before the earthquake.  
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Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) 
J. Gross & O. John 
Version October 3, 2000 
 
In this section, we would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in 
particular, how you control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. We are 
interested in two aspects of your emotional life.  One is your emotional experience, or 
what you feel like inside. The other is your emotional expression, or how you show 
your emotions in the way you talk, gesture, or behave. Although some of the 
following questions may seem similar to one another, they differ in important ways. 
For each item, please answer using the following scale: 
 
 
 
         1-----------------2------------------3------------------4------------------5------------------6------------------7 
strongly neutral strongly 
disagree  agree 
     
 
1. ____     I tend to control my emotions most of the time. 
2. ____    When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or 
amusement), I change what I’m thinking about. 
3.  ____     I keep my emotions to myself. 
4.  ____    When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I 
change what I’m thinking about. 
5.  ____    When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them. 
6.  ____    When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it  
in a way that helps me stay calm. 
7. ____     I control my emotions by not expressing them.  
8. ____    When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m 
thinking about the situation.  
9. ____     I almost never try to inhibit my emotional expressions.  
10. ____     I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation 
I’m in.  
11. ____    When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them. 
12. ____    Overall, I have a great deal of control over my emotions. 
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13. ____    When I want to control my emotions, I’m not likely to change the way 
I think about the situation.  
14. ____    When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m 
thinking about the situation.  
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Level of Exposure 
 
Please answer each question by indicating a number from 1 to 7 that describes your 
feelings best based on the scale below. Please be sure to answer all questions. 
 
 
 
         1-----------------2------------------3------------------4------------------5------------------6------------------7 
strongly neutral strongly 
disagree  agree 
     
 
 
1___How much damage did the earthquake cause to the area where you were when 
the earthquake happened?  
 
2___How much damage did the earthquake cause to your house?  
 
3___How much stress did you experience by losing family members and/or close 
friends during the earthquake?  
 
4___How much stress did you experience because your family members and/or close 
friends were injured by the earthquake?  
 
5___How much stress did you experience because you were injured by the 
earthquake?   
        
6___How much of your daily life has been inconvenienced as a result of earthquake? 
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Rumination Questionnaire 
 
Instructions: People think and do many different things when they have experienced 
the loss of a close relationship. Please read each of the items below and indicate how 
often, within the past 2 weeks, you have thought or done each one. Please indicate 
what you generally have done, not what you think you should do.  
 
1=Almost Never    2=Sometimes   3=Often   4=Almost Always   
 
1____Think about how alone you feel. 
2____Think, “I won’t be able to do my job/work because I feel so badly. 
3____Think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness 
4____Think about how hard it is to concentrate 
5____Think about hoe passive and unmotivated you feel 
6____Analyze recent events to try and understand why the relationship ended 
7____Think about how you don’t seem to feel anything anymore 
8____Think, “Why can’t I get going?” 
9____Think, “Why am I reacting this way?” 
10____Go away by yourself and think why you feel this way 
11____Write down what you are thinking about and analyze it. 
12____Think, about the relationship, wishing it would not have ended. 
13____Think, “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?” 
14____Think about how sad you feel 
15____Think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes   
16____Think about how you don’t feel up to doing anything 
17____Analyze your personality to try to understand why he/she left you 
18____Go someplace alone to think about your feelings 
19____Think about how angry you are with yourself 
20. ____Listen to sad music 
21. ____Isolate yourself and think about reasons why you feel sad 
22. ____Try to understand yourself by focusing on your feelings 
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Trait Meta-Mood Scale 
Instructions: We are interested in finding out what people feel and think about 
their emotions in general. Please read each statement and decide whether or not 
you agree with it and indicate a number from 1 to 7 that describes you best based 
on the scale below.  
 
 
         1-----------------2------------------3------------------4------------------5------------------6------------------7 
strongly neutral strongly 
disagree  agree 
     
 
 
1.___Feelings give direction to life. 
2.___I try to think good thoughts no matter how badly I feel. 
3___I am usually confused about how I feel. 
4___People would be better off if they felt less and thought more. 
5___When I become upset I remind myself of all the pleasures in life. 
6___I can never tell how I feel. 
7___Sometimes I can’t tell what my feelings are. 
8___I almost always know exactly how I am feeling. 
9___Although I am sometimes happy, I have a mostly pessimistic outlook. 
10___I am usually very clear about my feelings. 
11___No matter how badly I feel, I try to think about pleasant things. 
12___I am rarely confused about how I feel. 
13___I can’t make sense out of my feelings. 
14___Although I am sometimes sad, I have a mostly optimistic outlook. 
15___It is usually a waste of time to think about your emotions. 
16___When I am upset I realized that the good things in life are illusions. 
17___Feelings are a weakness humans have. 
18___I often think about my feelings. 
19___I am often aware of my feelings on a matter. 
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20___I do not usually care much about what I am feeling. 
21___The best way for me to handle my feelings is to experience them to the fullest. 
22___My belief and opinions always seem to change depending on how I feel. 
23___I feel at ease about my emotions. 
24___I never give into my emotions. 
25___I usually know my feelings about a matter. 
26___One should never be guided by emotions. 
27___I pay a lot of attention to how I feel. 
28___I do not pay much attention to my feelings. 
29___I believe in acting from the heart. 
30___I do not think it is worth paying attention to your emotions or your moods.   
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